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POLITICAL ADVERTISEMENTS IN THE ERA
OF FLEETING INDECENT IMAGES AND
UTTERANCES
LAVONDA N. REED-HUFF
INTRODUCTION

Television and radio advertisements for years have been
effective and popular campaign tools used by political candidates
to gain votes. In an era of increasingly negative political
campaign advertisements, some political figures and candidates
have been the target of negative broadcast advertisements,
suggesting that they have engaged in some form of sexually
immoral or somehow unacceptable conduct.1 Election seasons in
recent years have ushered in a new breed of increasingly vulgar
and sexually charged political broadcast advertisements. 2

So

extreme are some advertisements in this new genre of political
speech, they are dangerously close to violating current federal
law prohibiting the broadcast via television and radio of indecent
materials.
The once hypothetical sexually suggestive political
advertisement is now a reality, and the truly indecent political
advertisement might be on the near horizon. In the 1980s, Larry
Flynt, creator of Hustler magazine, launched a campaign for

I Associate Professor of Law, Syracuse University College of Law. Thank you to
Dean Hannah Arterian, Associate Professor Keith Bybee, Institute for the Study of
the Judiciary, Politics, and the Media, Professors Lisa Dolak, Paula Johnson,
William Wiecek, Leslie Bender, Rakesh Anand, the staff of the Barclay Law Library
at Syracuse University College of Law, David Solomon, Esq., Associate Professor
Akilah Folami, Hofstra University School of Law, and my research assistants
Shaina Schallop, Cedric McGee, and Patricia McNeal.
1 See YouTube, Too Hot for Corker, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cWkrw
ENN5CQ (last visited Apr. 20, 2010).
2 See id.; YouTube, Bad Call, httpJ/www.youtube.com/watch?v=DDZ-bPYWjd8
(last visited Apr. 20, 2010).
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President.3 Flynt promised that his campaign advertisements
would contain hardcore
pornography.4
The Federal
Communications Commission (the "FCC" or the "Commission")
was prepared at the time to issue a ruling permitting
broadcasters to reject the advertisements. 5
Flynt never
requested airtime for the advertisements, and the FCC's ruling
never was issued.6
This new breed of political advertisements-Flynt's proposed
advertisements not included-while not indecent under the
FCC's current definition, is closer to crossing the lines of
indecency than were offensive racist advertisements and
gruesome anti-abortion advertisements of years past. In 2006, a
sexually suggestive television advertisement appeared in
Tennessee endorsing Republican Bob Corker in his race against
Democrat Harold Ford, Jr. for a U.S. Senate seat.' The Corker
advertisement used sexually suggestive visual images to suggest
that Ford frequented wild sex parties and had sexual liaisons
with white women. Ford is black. In the advertisement, the
bare shoulders and face of an otherwise seemingly unclothed
young blonde woman appeared on the screen as the young blonde
winked and purred into the camera that she had previously
met Ford at a Playboy party.9 The advertisement closed with
another shot of the still questionably clothed young blonde
teasing Ford to call her. 10
Ford lost the election. 1'

Interview of FCC Enforcement Bureau Staff.
4 See id.
5 See id.
6 See Michael Isikoff, The FCC, WASH. POST, Jan. 3, 1984, at A15. In June 2007,
Flynt placed an advertisement in the Washington Post offering $1 million for stories
involving the sex lives of government officials. Chris Richards, Names & Faces,
WASH. POST, June 4, 2007, at C03.
7 The advertisement, titled "Too Hot for Corker"-sponsored by the Republican
National Committee-opens with an African-American woman posing the question
"Harold Ford looks good. Isn't that enough?" Then, the camera captures short sound
bites from a series of people who appear to be citizens on a city street making
comments about how Ford wants to protect the privacy of terrorists, will increase
taxes, favors gun control, is not worried about the threat of North Korea, and has
taken money from producers of pornographic movies-"Don't we all?" the citizen
chuckles. Too Hot for Corker, supra note 1.
8 Id.
'

9 Id.
10 Id.

" Vikas Bajaj et al., South, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2006, at P11.
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Another television advertisement broadcast in New York in
the same year endorsed Republican Raymond Meier in his U.S.
congressional campaign against Democrat Michael Arcuri. 12 The
advertisement opened with superimposed images of a woman
who appeared to be an exotic dancer straddling a chair and
seductively dancing while purring "Hi, sexy ...."13 Meanwhile,
the target of the advertisement, Arcuri, stared in the dancer's
direction while lasciviously and seductively licking his lips.14 The
advertisement accused Arcuri of using Oneida County, New York
taxpayer dollars to satisfy his sexual desires while on official
business by calling an adult fantasy telephone hotline and then
charging the call to his hotel room.15 Despite this advertisement,
which ran in the days leading up to the election, Arcuri defeated
16
his opponent to win the congressional seat.
In early 2009, Stormy Daniels, a pornographic movie star,
announced preliminary plans to run for the U.S. Senate from
Louisiana against incumbent David Vitter, who was involved in a
notorious call-girl scandal that rocked Washington, D.C. in
2007.1" A former nude model recently won election to the U.S.
Senate from Massachusetts.18 Photos of the now Senator's nude,
yet pixulated, body appeared in many news reports leading up to
the election.
The possibility of these individuals or their
challengers incorporating indecent material in their campaign
advertisements is not so far-fetched.
Scholars, the FCC, and the courts have pondered for years
how regulators would deal with the issue of indecency in political
12 The advertisement, titled "Bad Call," was paid for by the National Republican
Congressional Committee. Annenberg Political Fact Check, Republican Mudslinging
on an Industrial Scale, Oct. 27, 2006, http://www.factcheck.org/article460.html.
It also features fleeting images of a clothed male lower body. See Bad Call, supra
note 2.
13 Bad Call, supra note 2.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Raymond Hernandez, G.O.P. Loses 4 House Seats in New York Region, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 8, 2006, at P2.
17 See, e.g., Jonathan Tilove, Adult Film Actress Contemplates Run To Unseat
Vitter; She Asks Flynt To Be Campaign Manager, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans),
Feb. 13, 2009, at 4.
" Frank Bruni, Where Scott Brown Is Coming From, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2010,
at MM24.
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broadcasting. To date, they have focused primarily on the body
of cases dealing with political advertisements depicting
abortions, aborted fetuses, and racial hate speech. 9 Existing
cases have turned on the statutory and regulatory definitions of
"indecency," "profanity," and "obscenity" and have suggested that
broadcasters might have certain immunities and programming
rights with respect to their decision to air political
advertisements containing material they deem indecent,
offensive, inappropriate, and harmful to children.2 °
These
newer,
more
sexually
suggestive
political
advertisements present the dilemma at which lawmakers, courts,
and scholars have hinted for years: how to reconcile three
seemingly conflicting federal statutes which, on the one hand,
seek to give political candidates greater access to the television
and radio media and consequently to the eyes and ears of the
19E.g., Complaint by Atlanta NAACP Concerning Section 315 Political Broad.
by J.B. Stoner, 36 F.C.C.2d 635 (1972) (use of the term "nigger") [hereinafter Stoner
I]; Complaint by Bond Atlanta NAACP Concerning Political Broad., 69 F.C.C.2d 943
(1978) (use of the term "nigger") [hereinafter Stoner II]; Letter from Stewart, FCC to
Pepper & Gastfreund, 7 F.C.C.R. 5599 (Aug. 21, 1992) (regarding broadcast of
political campaign advertisement containing abortion-related material) [hereinafter
Mass Media Bureau Letter to Kaye Scholer]; see also Samantha Mortlock, What the
[Expletive Deleted] Is a Broadcaster To Do? The Conflict Between Political Access
Rules and the BroadcastIndecency Prohibition,14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 193, 193-95
(2006) (characterizing correctly the "dilemma" facing broadcast licensees);
Complaints Regarding Various Television Broads. Between Feb. 2, 2002 & Mar. 8,
2005, 21 F.C.C.R. 2664 (2006) [hereinafter Omnibus Order]. A complaint was filed
against a broadcast licensee for the broadcast outside the safe harbor of a political
advertisement that mentioned rape, sodomy, and molestation. Id. at 2707. The
advertisement did not feature any nude images or depictions of any of the described
acts. Id. at 2708. The narrator of the advertisement states:
He used candy to lure the children into the house. Once inside, the three
children were sexually molested. A four-year old girl raped. Her brotherssodomized. A Belleville man was arrested and convicted for the crime after
trying to develop pictures of the abuse. Despite prosecutor's objections,
Judge Lloyd Karmeier gave him probation, saying "The court should grant
leniency. . ." Another case where Karmeier let a violent criminal out into
the community. Lloyd Karmeier-the wrong choice for Supreme Court.
Paid for by the Democratic Party of Illinois.
Id. at 2708 n.236. The Commission stated that "[blecause we find that the
advertisement is not indecent, we need not decide whether the Commission may
propose forfeitures
against
licensees
that broadcast indecent political
advertisements outside of the safe harbor." Id. at 2708 n.234.
20 See, e.g., Stoner I, supra note 19, at 636-38; Stoner II,
supra note 19, at 944;
Mass Media Bureau Letter to Kaye Scholer, supra note 19, at 5599-600; Becker v.
FCC, 95 F.3d 75, 79 (D.C. Cir. 1996); see also LaVonda N. Reed-Huff, Offensive
Political Speech 1970s to 2008: A Broadcaster's Moral Choice, 8 U. MD. L.J. RACE,
RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 241 (2008).
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electorate, yet, on the other hand, seek to remove indecent
material from the broadcast airwaves during hours of the day
when children are likely to be in the audience.2 1 These statutes
obligate broadcast licensees to provide nondiscriminatory and
uncensored access to candidates for political office, yet fail to
state an exception to broadcast indecency rules or to grant
immunity to broadcasters forced to air political advertisements
that contain at best sexually suggestive, and in the worst case,
indecent, profane, or obscene material.2 2 While no broadcast
licensee has been sanctioned by the government for the broadcast
of an indecent political advertisement, the FCC has never had to
answer that specific question. Moreover, the law is not clear that
broadcasters are immune from such sanction were they to
broadcast such an advertisement. With the recent decision by
the U.S. Supreme Court in FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc.,
and the FCC's policy of punishing even isolated and fleeting
indecent material, the dilemma of broadcasters is even more
profound.2 3
Industry insiders and regulators point to the remote
possibility of a political candidate seeking airtime to broadcast a
political advertisement containing indecent material.2 4 In an era
where the media appears to take great fascination in the sex
lives of elected officials and greater satisfaction in actually
catching and embarrassing them for these exploits, we are
certain to see more of this type of material emerge in political
campaign advertisements. 25 Additionally, advertisements of this
21 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (2006)

(prohibiting

broadcast

indecency);

47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7) (2006) (affording reasonable access to broadcast facilities for
candidates
for federal
office);
47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (2006) (providing equal
opportunities for use of broadcast facilities by candidates for the same office and

prohibiting censorship).
22See sources cited supra note 21.
2 See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800 (2009).
24 See, e.g., Milagro Rivera-Sanchez & Paul H. Gates, Jr., Abortion on the Air:
Broadcasters and Indecent Political Advertising, 46 FED. COMM. L.J. 267 (1994)
(discussing indecent material in political advertising). One easily can imagine an
advertisement featuring protesters uttering expletives or wearing clothing
containing indecent material, whereas an undeniably indecent political
advertisement seems unimaginable to most.
2-5Each of the anti-Ford and the anti-Arcuri advertisements were broadcast in a
news cycle when the public also was bombarded by unrelated broadcast news stories
of a congressman engaging in inappropriate sexual e-mail exchanges, and perhaps
worse, with underage boys, and of an evangelical Christian minister using drugs and
having sex with male prostitutes. See Michael Wolff, It's the Adultery, Stupid,

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84:199

type are likely to become more prevalent in the wake of the
Supreme Court's decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election
Commission, which removes longstanding prohibitions against
corporations and unions using money from their own treasuries
to engage in electioneering communications.2 6 Presumably, in
future election cycles, broadcasters will receive far more requests
by third-party noncandidates for airtime. Such third parties
might take greater liberties with racy commercial content than
would a candidate him or herself. Furthermore, due to the
financial challenges facing broadcasters in recent years, local
broadcasters are likely to welcome the new revenue stream
flowing from corporations previously prohibited from purchasing
advocacy oriented political advertisements.
This Article does not assert that either the aforementioned
anti-Ford or anti-Arcuri political advertisements squarely falls

VANITY FAIR, June 2008, available at http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/

2008/06/wolff200806/ ("Politics is now about sex.... Sex (sex, not gender) in politics
is as significant a subtext as race. It has the power to alter elections, undermine
parties, and, possibly, change history.... We want to know.... Sex completes the

picture-it explains so much.... It's a point of identification and differentiation.");
Bill Cotterell & Jim Ash, Foley Resigns from Congress, TALLAHASSEE DEMOCRAT,

Sept. 30, 2006, at Al (discussing the resignation of Rep. Mark Foley (R-Fla.) amid
allegations of substance abuse and inappropriate sexual conduct with underage
congressional pages); Alan Cooperman, Minister Admits To Buying Drugs and
Massage, WASH. POST, Nov. 4, 2006, at A02 (reporting on the activities of evangelical
minister Ted Haggard). Since that time, the sordid details of the private lives of
countless other politicians have flooded the broadcast and cable airwaves. See, e.g.,
Senator Pleads Guilty in Sex-Sting Case, VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Aug. 28, 2007, at A14

(reporting on the guilty plea of Senator Larry Craig (R-ID) stemming from his arrest
for allegedly inappropriate behavior in an airport men's restroom); see also Mark
Mueller, Call Girl Scandal Engulfs Spitzer: N.Y Governor Issues Apology, THE
TIMES (Trenton, N.J.), Mar. 11, 2008, at A01 (reporting on the admission of New
York governor Eliot Spitzer of association with high priced escort service); David
Zucchino & Elizabeth Mehren, McGreevy's Double Life Changed in a Single Day,
L.A. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2004, at 26 (reporting on the revelation by the married New
Jersey governor James E. McGreevy that he was gay and had an affair with a male
staffer); Prentiss Findlay, Sanford Tryst Makes Headlines Worldwide, POST &
COURIER (Charleston, S.C.), June 26, 2009, at A6 (reporting on Governor Mark
Sanford of South Carolina's confession of an affair); Edwards' Saga a Sad
Unraveling, CHAPEL HILL HERALD, Feb. 12, 2010, at ch2 (reporting on the "sex, lies
and videotape scandal" surrounding former candidate for U.S. Vice President John
Edwards); Edwards Saga a Sad Reality Tale, CHAPEL HILL HERALD, May 21, 2009,

at ch2 (reporting on the investigation and controversy concerning John Edwards'
relationship with a campaign videographer).
26 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
27 Kevin Downey, In Political Spending, All Markets Not Equal, TVNEWSCHECK.
Mar. 3, 2010, http://www.tvnewscheck.com/articles/2010/03/03/daily. 1/.
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within the subject matter scope of the FCC's current definition of
indecency, but that they do signal a gradual yet significant shift
toward the willingness of political candidates and their
supporters to pay for campaign advertisements with a sexual
overtone. This Article poses a question that has been asked by
other scholars: What is a broadcaster to do in the event it is
presented with political material that might fall within the
subject matter scope of the FCC's definition of indecency? This
Article offers some resolutions to this conflict taking into
consideration recent court cases dealing with the issue of
broadcast indecency.
This Article also addresses the recent struggle of the FCC
and the courts to define indecency, to defend the continued
relevance of current indecency rules in light of a converging and
ever-changing technological environment, as well as an effort to
clarify the boundaries of sanctionable material. The FCC has on
more than one occasion sidestepped ruling on the issue of
indecent political advertisements. In those cases, the material
was determined not to have passed the threshold of satisfying the
definition of indecency rendering the indecent political
advertisement issue unripe for review.2 8 None of these prior
cases clearly answers the question of a broadcaster's liability in
the event a broadcaster airs or chooses not to air a political
advertisement that actually is determined to be indecent,
profane, or obscene as those terms have come to be defined.
Scholars have proposed resolutions to this dilemma,
including, inter alia, granting immunity from indecency
sanctions and repealing one or more of the rules forming the
dilemma.2 9 The recent racy political advertisements go to the
heart of the question of how broadcasters, without clear statutory
language, may handle requests by political candidates, their
supporters, or their opponents to air campaign advertisements
that come close to satisfying the Commission's definition of
indecency, and perhaps even the definitions of obscenity or
profanity as well.
Part I of this Article describes the statutory conflict. This
Part explains each of the rules and includes a detailed discussion
of recent broadcast indecency actions including the indecency
2 See, e.g., Omnibus Order, supra note 19, at 2707-08; Stoner II, supra note 19,
at 944.
2

See Mortlock, supra note 19, at 223-26.
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cases recently decided by the U.S. Court of Appeals and the U.S.
Supreme Court.3" Part II addresses cases specifically involving
political broadcast advertisements in which the courts granted
immunity or excepted broadcasters of political advertisements
from punishment under the indecency prohibition. Part III
specifically evaluates the recent political advertisements
containing sexually suggestive material, including the anti-Ford
and anti-Arcuri advertisements. This Part addresses how courts
have handled earlier claims of offensive political speech offering
insight into how they might handle future claims.
Part IV of this Article revisits some of the earlier proposals
for resolution of the dilemma facing broadcast licensees and
offers new solutions to this dilemma.3 1 This Article reiterates the
call for immunity for broadcasters that air political
advertisements containing indecent material. In addition to
evaluating this proposal, this Article reiterates some other
previously suggested resolutions and recommends others. This
Article
recommends
the
following,
in
order
of
preference: (1) amend 18 U.S.C. § 1464 to expressly except
political advertisements; (2) grant immunity to broadcasters;
(3) repeal the indecency rules altogether or make them applicable
to all services; (4) change the definition of indecent material;
(5) amend 47 U.S.C. §§ 312 and 315 to prohibit indecent material
in political broadcast advertisements; (6) permit channeling of
indecent advertisements; (7) require or permit channeling of all
political advertisements to the safe harbor; (8) wait for the
perfect case and decide then; or (9) repeal 47 U.S.C. §§ 312 and
315 and the Zapple Doctrine.
In the absence of congressional action, courts could carve out
a judicially created exception to the indecency statute as it has
done in other contexts. This Article suggests that, despite the
U.S. Supreme Court's holding in Fox Television Stations, which
upheld the FCC's policy regarding fleeting indecent materials,
the FCC must refine its indecency definition and regulatory
scheme not only to address constitutional First Amendment
issues, but also to offer a more workable rule for broadcasters to
follow in making programming decisions.3 2

30See, e.g., FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800 (2009).
31 See sources cited infra note 317.
32 See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006).
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I.

THE STATUTORY CONFLICT

All FCC broadcast licensees must serve the "public
convenience, interest, [and] necessity."33 That obligation has
applied to the daily operations and overall mission of
broadcasters since the earliest days of regulation of the industry.
Congress and the FCC have enacted statutes, rules, and
regulations that balance the interests of the various entities that
comprise the "public" the FCC and its licensees are charged to
serve. Among these statutes are those prohibiting indecency and
those making the broadcast airwaves available to political
candidates, while at the same time prohibiting censorship. 4
There are three main statutes promulgated to address these
issues. The first statute in the trio is 47 U.S.C. § 312, which
requires licensees of broadcast stations to afford reasonable
access to its facilities for all candidates for federal elective
office. 35 The second statute is 47 U.S.C. § 315, which requires
broadcasters to afford equal opportunities to use broadcast
facilities to all legally qualified candidates for the same political
office and prohibits broadcasters from censoring political
speech.36 Finally, there is 18 U.S.C. § 1464, which prohibits the
broadcast of indecent, obscene, or profane material over the
broadcast airwaves.
' 47 U.S.C. § 307(a), (c)(1) (2006); see also Radio Act of 1927, Pub. L. No. 632, 44
Stat. 1162 (1927); Communications Act of 1934 (codified as amended at
47 U.S.C. § 151 (2006)); Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110
Stat. 56.
' See 47 U.S.C. §§ 312, 315, 326 (2006); 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (2006).
3, 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7).
36

Id. § 315. A legally qualified candidate of public office is defined as any person

who has publicly announced that he or she is a candidate for public office, meets the
qualifications for serving in that office, is eligible to be elected to that office, and
makes a substantial showing that he or she is a bona fide candidate for the office or
for nomination to the office. 47 C.F.R. § 73.1940 (2010). Section 326 prohibits the
FCC from engaging in censorship of broadcast material. See 47 U.S.C. § 326; see also
Metromedia, Inc. Regarding Socialist Labor Party of Ca., 40 F.C.C. 423 (1965); Use
of Broadcast Facilities by Candidates for Public Office, 24 F.C.C.2d 832, 860 (1970).
37 See 18 U.S.C. 1464. While § 312 and § 315 do apply to cable and satellite
systems, they have only limited applicability in these contexts. The obligations in
those sections extend to cable and direct broadcast satellite service ("DBS") channels
only to the extent that the relevant programming is carried on a cable television or
DBS system channel 'subject to the exclusive control" of the cable or DBS provider.
47 C.F.R. § 76.205 (2010) (emphasis added); see also 47 C.F.R. § 25.701(b)(2) (2010)
("DBS origination programming is defined as programming (exclusive of broadcast
signals) carried on a DBS facility over one or more channels and subject to the
exclusive control of the DBS provider."). A cable system is defined as any facility
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This conflict lies in the inability of a broadcaster to reject
candidate-sponsored political advertisements that contain
indecent, obscene, or profane material. By leaving this issue
unresolved, the federal government has hogtied broadcasters
when it comes to their discretion to pick and choose which
political advertisements they will air and when during the
broadcast day they will air them.
A.

47 U.S.C. § 312: Sanctions for FailureTo Provide Reasonable
Access and for Broadcastof Indecent Material

In recognition of the extraordinarily influential role played
by the broadcast media in shaping the public's views and
opinions
on
political
matters,
Congress
enacted
47 U.S.C. § 312(a) seeking to give political candidates for federal
office greater access to this influential medium of public
communication with potential voters.38 Congress also sought to
contain the cost of this access. 9
Section 312(a) of the
Communications Act provides for administrative sanctions for,
among other things, the broadcast of indecent material 40 and the
failure to allow candidates for federal elective office reasonable
access to broadcast stations.4 '
Paragraph (7) of § 312(a) affords legally qualified candidates
for federal office an affirmative right of reasonable access to a
licensee's station and allows for license revocation in the event of
designed to provide video programming to multiple subscribers through "closed
transmission paths," and does not include, inter alia, "a facility that serves
subscribers without using any public right-of-way." 47 U.S.C. § 522(7)(B) (2006); see
also FCC v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 310 (1993). These rules do not
apply to the Internet.
8 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7).
39 See CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 379 (1981) (citing Federal Election
Campaign Act of 1971: Hearings on S.1, S.382, and S.956 before the Subcommittee
on Communications of the Senate Committee on Commerce, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess., 2
(1971) (remarks of Sen. Pastore); S. Rep. No. 92-96, 20 (1971), U.S. Code Cong. &
Admin. News 1972, 1773-74).
40 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(6) (providing for administrative sanctions for violation of
18 U.S.C. § 1464-broadcast of indecent material).
41 § 312(a)(7). The FCC has further regulated
these requirements in
47 C.F.R. § 73.1944 (2010). Paragraph (a)(6) provides that the Federal
Communications Commission may revoke any station license or construction permit
for violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1464, which also provides for imprisonment of not more
than two years. See 18 U.S.C. § 1464. Section 312 also provides for license revocation
in the event a licensee broadcasts a lottery or engages in mail fraud. The court of
appeals deferred to the FCC on the determination of when a campaign actually had
begun. See CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 629 F.2d 1, 18 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
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a broadcaster's willful or repeated failure to allow reasonable
access to, or to permit purchase of reasonable amounts of time for
the use of a broadcasting station, other than a noncommercial
educational broadcast station, by a legally qualified candidate for
federal elective office on behalf of his candidacy.
The statute does not define reasonable access, nor do FCC
regulations offer any one particular definition.
The FCC,
however, has developed an individualized, case-by-case set of
interpretative factors to be considered to effectuate the
reasonable access requirements of § 312(a)(7), including the
following: (1) a candidate's stated purpose in seeking air time;
(2) the amount of time previously sold to the candidate; (3) the
disruptive impact on the broadcaster's regular program schedule;
and (4) the likelihood of requests for time by rival candidates
under federal broadcast equal opportunity requirements. 43 The
Supreme Court upheld the FCC's standard and practice of caseby-case determinations of reasonableness in CBS v. FCC.' The
Court also opined that this practice did not "improperly involve
the FCC in the electoral process or significantly impair
broadcasters' editorial discretion."45
Broadcasters must justify denials of access and may not use
any of these considerations as a pretext for denial of access.46
Additionally, broadcasters must cite "a realistic danger of
substantial program disruption" to justify denial of reasonable

47 U.S.C. § 312 (a)(7).
See CBS, Inc., 453 U.S. at 375, 387; Codification of the Comm'n's Political
Programming Policies, 7 F.C.C.R. 678, 681 (1991) [hereinafter 1991 Policy
Statement] ("[Tihere may be circumstances when a licensee might reasonably refuse
broadcast time to political candidates during certain parts of the broadcast day.");
Public Notice, Licensee Responsibility Under Amendments to the Commc'ns Act
Made by the Fed. Election Campaign Act of 1971, 47 F.C.C.2d 516, 516-17 (1974)
[hereinafter Licensee Responsibility]; Comm'n Policy in Enforcing Section 312(a)(7)
of the Commc'ns Act, Report & Order, 68 F.C.C.2d 1079, 1089 n.14, 1091 (1978)
("there may be circumstances when a licensee might reasonably refuse broadcast
time to political candidates during certain parts of the broadcast day."); Becker v.
FCC, 95 F.3d 75, 80 (1996) [hereinafter FCC 1978 Report & Order]. These
circumstances are not defined. The Commission has indicated that in weighing these
factors, it will focus on two issues: "(1) has the broadcaster adverted to the proper
standards in deciding whether to grant a request for access, and (2) is the
broadcaster's explanation for his decision reasonable in terms of those standards?"
CBS, Inc., 629 F.2d at 18.
CBS, Inc., 453 U.S. at 386-91.
' Id. at 369.
42
4

4

See id. at 387.
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access.47
Generally, broadcasters are accorded deference,
provided they demonstrate that they have acted reasonably and
in good faith.4 8 Blanket, across-the-board types of policies
denying access to the station will not be accorded such deference
upon agency review of a denial and very likely will be found
unreasonable. 9
The affirmative right conferred upon federal candidates by
the section is limited. This statutory provision does not confer
upon political candidates any affirmative right of access to a
broadcast station during any particular time of the broadcast
day, but candidates may not be excluded from certain parts of the
broadcast day, including prime time.5 ° Similarly, there is no
right to time during any particular program, 51 nor is there any
promise of free air time.5 2 Candidates must be willing to pay for
the air time.53
B.

47 U.S.C. §§ 315 and 326: Equal Opportunitiesand
ProhibitionAgainst Censorship

1.

Equal Opportunities for Competing Candidates

While § 312(a)(7) provides candidates for federal office
affirmative, albeit, reasonable access to use broadcast stations,
§ 315 of the Communications Act merely provides candidates for
any public office equal opportunities of access to a licensee's
station as are afforded other candidates.5 4 The intent of this
section is to afford rival candidates a comparable audience reach.
Specifically, § 315 provides, "[i]f any licensee shall permit any
47 Id.

' See Carter-Mondale Presidential Comm., Inc., 74 F.C.C.2d 657, 673-74
(1979); Carter-Mondale Presidential Comm., Inc., 74 F.C.C.2d 631, 644 (1979); FCC
1978 Report & Order, supra note 43, at 1093-94.
41 See CBS, Inc., 453 U.S. at 376 (citing CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 629 F.2d 1, 22 (D.C.
Cir. 1980)).
' See FCC 1978 Report & Order, supra note 45, at 1090; Licensee
Responsibility, supra note 43, at 517.
51 1991 Policy Statement, supra note 43, at 697-98.
52 See FCC 1978 Report & Order, supra note 48, at 1088; 1991 Policy Statement,
supra note 43, at 687.
' See Kennedy for President Comm. v. FCC, 636 F.2d 432, 448 (1980); Law of
Political Broad. and Cablecasting, 69 F.C.C.2d 2209, 2288 (1978). Candidates are
entitled to the lowest unit rate broadcasters charge their most favored commercial
advertisers for that specific time of the broadcast day. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.1942
(2010).
' 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (2006).
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person who is a legally qualified candidate for any public office to
use a broadcasting station, he shall afford equal opportunities to
all other such candidates for that office in the use of such
broadcasting station."5 5
Section 315 does not grant candidates an affirmative right of
reasonable access to a broadcast station in the way § 312(a)(7)
does to federal candidates, but merely provides that once a
broadcaster has provided access to its station to one candidate for
any political office, it must provide the same access to its station
to other candidates for that same political office.56
The corresponding Zapple Doctrine represents an FCC policy
granting equal time to third-party noncandidates once a
broadcaster has provided airtime to an opposing third party.5
,5

Id. (emphasis added).

56This includes the same amount of airtime, the same time slots, and the same
prices. See, e.g., Stephens, 11 F.C.C. 61, 64 (1945) (noting that not only must
candidates be offered the same amount of airtime, but the desirability of the time
slots offered competing candidates also must be comparable); see also Use of Broad.
Facilities by Candidates for Pub. Office, 24 F.C.C.2d 832, 878, 881 (1970); Television
Co. of Am., 40 F.C.C. 319, 319 (1961); Grace, 40 F.C.C. 297, 297 (1958); Political
Broadcasting Requirements, 40 F.C.C. 265, 265 (1955) (noting that the FCC does not
mandate particular rates but requires equal treatment of candidates in rates
charged). The rule confers a legal right to a candidate only when an opposing
candidate, not someone speaking on behalf of the opposing candidate, has used the
station to advance his or her candidacy. See Felix v. Westinghouse Radio Stations,
Inc., 186 F.2d 1, 2-3 (3d Cir. 1950). While Section 315 does not specifically address
the rights of groups supporting or opposing candidates to access the broadcast
station, pursuant to FCC policy, third parties might have a right of equal
opportunity in certain circumstances.
-1 Request by Nicholas Zapple, Commc'ns Counsel, Comm. on Commerce for
Interpretive Ruling Concerning Section 315 Fairness Doctrine, 23 F.C.C.2d 707,
707-09 (1970). Section 312 and Section 315 were invoked in an interesting way
during the 2004 presidential campaign. In Fall, 2004, the Sinclair Broadcast Group
("Sinclair") ordered all of its sixty-plus broadcast stations to show the film "Stolen
Honor: Wounds That Never Heal" ("Stolen Honor"), a film featuring Vietnam
veterans criticizing Democratic candidate John Kerry's anti-war activities upon
returning to the U.S. following his wartime service. See Jim Rutenberg, Broadcast
Group To Pre-empt Programsfor Anti-Kerry Film, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2004, at 19.
Airing the film would have preempted regularly scheduled primetime television
programming. Id. Democrats claimed that Sinclair violated the equal time provision
by not giving Kerry an opportunity to respond. See Kerry Wants Equal Time, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 16, 2004, at 12; Bill Carter, Broadcaster'sStock Picks Up After Change
on Kerry Film, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2004, at 27; Bill Carter & Scott Shane, Viewers
Get Only a Peek of a Movie Chiding Kerry, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2004, at 12. The
party also claimed that the film amounted to a prolonged free political
advertisement for George W. Bush that violated the campaign finance rules by not
also airing a pro-Kerry advertisement of equal length. See Jim Rutenberg, Party To
File Complaint Against Broadcaster,N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2004, at 22; Sinclair Free
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Though considered to be related to the now defunct Fairness
Doctrine, the Zapple Doctrine, which seems to have survived, is
viewed as a quasi-equal opportunity principle that entitles
supporters of a candidate with substantial support-generally
nominees of major political parties-time comparable to that
offered supporters of another candidate.5" The Zapple Doctrine
does not entitle supporters to the same degree of time, but
rather, a roughly comparable opportunity to buy comparable
time. This doctrine was created to deal with potential political
imbalances that could be brought about by the influence of thirdparty supporters of candidates to avoid triggering equal
opportunities for competing candidates.
Section 315 also contains four exceptions.59 The section
provides that there has been no use of the station by a legally
qualified candidate when the candidate appears in: (1) a bona
fide newscast, 0 (2) a bona fide news interview,"' (3) a bona fide
news documentary if the appearance of the candidate is
incidental to the presentation of the subject or subjects covered
To Run Its Attack, But We Trust Voters To See Through Its Hypocricy, ASHEVILLE
CITIZEN-TIMES, Oct. 15, 2004, at 8A. It was characterized as an "illegal campaign
contribution." SinclairFree To Run Its Attack, But We Trust Voters To See Through
Its Hypocricy, supra; see also Rutenberg, Party To File Complaint Against
Broadcaster,supra. Sinclair eventually decided not to air the entire "Stolen Honor"
film choosing instead to show "A POW Story: Politics, Pressure and the Media"
which included portions of "Stolen Honor" and segments of another film "Going
Upriver: The Long War of John Kerry" that Sinclair claimed contained segments
more flattering to John Kerry. See Bill Carter, BroadcasterPlans To Show Parts of
Film, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2004, at 21; Carter & Shane, supra. In an interesting
twist of application of the reasonable access and equal time statutes, the equal time
provision and reasonable access provisions would have given more access to George
W. Bush because it was John Kerry whose image appeared on screen. See
Rutenberg, Broadcast Group To Pre-emptProgramsfor Anti-Kerry Film.
" The Fairness Doctrine required broadcasters to cover controversial issues,
provide balanced coverage, and give free response time to individuals or groups
covered by a station's news report. It was upheld in Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395
U.S. 367 (1969), and later repealed by Complaint of Syracuse Peace Council, 2 FCC
Rcd at 5043 (1987).
5947 U.S.C. § 315(a).
o Id. § 315(a)(1).
61 Id. § 315(a)(2); see also Capitol Radio Networks, 11 F.C.C.R. 4674, 4674
(1996); Block, 7 F.C.C.R. 6882, 6883 (1992) (noting that the FCC also will consider
whether the licensee has independent control over the program, and whether the
broadcaster has control over format, content, and selection of interview participants
are based on the licensee's good faith judgment as to the participant's
newsworthiness, rather than for the purpose of furthering the participant's political
candidacy); Station KFDX-TV, 40 F.C.C. 374, 374 (1962) (stating that bona fide news
interviews must be regularly scheduled for the purposes of § 315).
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by the news documentary, 62 or (4) on-the-spot coverage of bona
fide news events, including, but not limited to, political
conventions and activities incidental thereto.6 3
Until 2010, corporations and labor organizations were
prohibited from using funds from their general treasuries to
engage in electioneering communications. 4 The Supreme Court,

Ferrall, 46 F.C.C.2d 1113, 1114 (1974)
(asserting that the candidate's appearance must be incidental to the presentation of
the subject matter and not simply to advance the candidate's candidacy).
6 47 U.S.C. § 315(a)(4); see also Kennedy for President Comm. v. FCC, 636 F.2d
417, 426 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (noting that three factors will be considered to determine
whether coverage of a candidate's press conference is exempt as on-the-spot coverage
of a news event: (1) whether -the conference is live; (2) whether the broadcaster
makes a good faith determination that the conference is a bona fide news event; and
(3) whether the broadcaster demonstrates any favoritism toward the candidate);
Nat'l Org. for Women v. FCC, 555 F.2d 1002, 1010 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (noting that the
Commission will not question a broadcast licensee's judgment as to what constitutes
news "unless there is extrinsic evidence of deliberate distortion or news staging or
unless the licensee consistently fails to report news events of public importance that
could not in good faith be ignored") (citations omitted); Hargove, 66 F.C.C.2d 1055
(1976) (holding that an appearance by a candidate on a newscast, bona fide news
interview, bona fide news documentary or on-the-spot coverage of a bona fide news
event is not "deemed a use of a broadcasting station for the purposes of Section
62

47 U.S.C. § 315(a)(3); see, e.g.,

315").

2 U.S.C. § 441b (2006), invalidiated by Citizens United v. Fed. Election
Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). An "electioneering communication" is defined as
any broadcast, cable, or satellite communication which refers to a clearly
identified candidate for Federal office ... made within 60 days before a
general, special, or runoff election for the office sought by the candidate; or
30 days before a primary or preference election, or a convention or caucus
of a political party that has authority to nominate a candidate, for the office
sought by the candidate; and in the case of a communication which refers to
a candidate for an office other than President or Vice President, is targeted
to the relevant electorate ... [or] any broadcast, cable, or satellite
communication which promotes or supports a candidate for that office, or
attacks or opposes a candidate for that office (regardless of whether the
communication expressly advocates a vote for or against a candidate) and
which also is suggestive of no plausible meaning other than an exhortation
to vote for or against a specific candidate.
2 U.S.C. § 434 (Supp. I 2007), invalidiated by Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876. The
term "electioneering communication" does not include-(i) a communication appearing in a news story, commentary, or editorial
distributed through the facilities of any broadcasting station, unless such
facilities are owned or controlled by any political party, political committee,
or candidate;
(ii) a communication which constitutes an expenditure or an independent
expenditure under this Act;
(iii) a communication which constitutes a candidate debate or forum
conducted pursuant to regulations adopted by the Commission, or which

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84:199

in
Citizens
United, held
that
2 U.S.C. § 441b
was
unconstitutional as applied to corporations engaged in express
advocacy of a political candidate.65 Citing First Amendment
concerns about promoting a free marketplace of ideas and
affording citizens as much information as possible in making
voting decisions,6 6 the Court potentially opened the floodgates for
corporate money to influence political campaigns.6 7
With the exception of political action committees created by
corporations, until 2010, as it relates to reasonable access under
§ 312 and equal opportunities under § 315 and the Zapple
Doctrine, these rules were not applicable to corporations and
unions. To date, whether the equal opportunity provisions will
apply to corporations also remains unresolved. It is likely that
they will be found to create equal opportunity rights in
corporations using their own treasury funds, not just those of
their political action committees.
It remains to be seen whether, in the wake of Citizens
United, Congress will extend to corporations and third parties
the right of reasonable access to broadcast stations. Right now,
the right of access afforded by § 312 applies only to federal
candidates. Because the rule does not apply to candidates other
than federal candidates, a good case could be made for not
extending this right of access to corporations or to other third
parties either.
2.

Censorship Prohibition and Channeling

In addition to equal opportunity protection, § 315 also
68
It
prohibits broadcasters from censoring broadcast material.
provides in relevant part that "such licensee shall have no power
of censorship over the material broadcast under the provisions of

solely promotes such a debate or forum and is made by or on behalf of the
person sponsoring the debate or forum; or
(iv) any other communication exempted under such regulations as the
Commission may promulgate.
Id.
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876.
1 Id. at 903-08.
617
Id. at 968 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
6 47 U.S.C. § 315(a); 1991 Policy Statement, supra note 43, at 683; see also
47 U.S.C. § 326 (2006) (prohibiting the FCC from engaging in censorship of
broadcast content).
6
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this section. No obligation is imposed under this subsection upon
any licensee to allow the use of its station by any such
candidate."69
Section 315 does not expressly state that the indecency
prohibition of 18 U.S.C. § 146470 does not apply to political
broadcast material. Additionally, § 1464 does not state that
political advertisements are excepted from the indecency,
obscenity, and profanity prohibition. 1 In other words, although
neither a licensee nor the government may censor political
broadcast material under § 315 or § 326, respectively, neither
section expressly excepts political broadcast material from what
may be considered actionably indecent.
Section 326 prohibits the government from censoring or
prohibiting speech up front, but does not prohibit the government
from punishing, after the fact, speech that violates § 1464.72 This
loophole, and that in § 312, are what potentially could find
broadcasters in a quandary, unable to prohibit the speech
themselves, unable to request that the Commission prohibit the
speech, yet not insulated from liability should indecent political
speech be broadcast over the public airwaves.
In the 1970s, broadcasters were faced with the dilemma of
what to do when a political candidate requested broadcast time
to air a political advertisement in which the candidate spewed
white supremacist hate speech and boldly referred to blacks as
"niggers."7 3 By the early 1990s, broadcasters were faced with the
69 47 U.S.C. § 315(a).
70 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (2006).

Id.
See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 738 (1978) ("We conclude, therefore,
that § 326 does not limit the Commission's authority to impose sanctions on
licensees who engage in obscene, indecent, or profane broadcasting."). In 1927 and
1934, the anticensorship provision of § 326 and the indecency prohibition of § 1464
were enacted in the same section. A 1948 revision of the U.S. Federal Criminal Code
to include statutory provisions located in other titles, the prohibition against the
broadcast of obscene, indecent, and profane material was removed from the
Communications Act and reenacted as part of the criminal code. Courts have
concluded that this change in the criminal code was not intended to change the
applicability of the anticensorship provision of § 326.
73 See generally Stoner II, supra note 19; Stoner I, supra note 19. During his
U.S. senatorial campaign in Georgia, J. B. Stoner made a political announcement
stating:
I am J. B. Stoner. I am the only candidate for U.S. Senator who is for the
white people. I am the only candidate who is against integration. All of the
other candidates are race mixers to one degree or another. I say we must
repeal Gambrell's civil rights law. Gambrell's law takes jobs from us whites
71
72
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dilemma of how to handle requests for airtime by candidates for
political office to broadcast advertisements depicting aborted
fetuses.7 4 At the time, it was argued by broadcasters and some in
the public that the advertisements either were indecent, obscene,
profane, or all of the above, and therefore should be barred from
broadcast television altogether.75
In the alternative, it was
suggested that the advertisements be relegated to hours of the
viewing day when children were less likely to be in the viewing
audience and when the chance of potential harm to them would
76
be reduced.
C.

18 U.S.C. § 1464: ProhibitionAgainst BroadcastIndecency,
Obscenity, and Profanity

Section 1464 of title 18 of the United States Code provides
that "[wihoever utters any obscene, indecent, or profane language
by means of radio communication shall be fined... or imprisoned
not more than two years, or both."7 7 The purpose of this law is to
protect children from harmful material broadcast over the public
airwaves.7" In addition to the two-year prison term, violation of
this section also subjects a broadcast licensee to license
revocation and a fine of up to $325,000 per violation. 79 The
and gives those jobs to the niggers. The main reason why niggers want
integration is because the niggers want our white women. I am for law and
order with the knowledge that you cannot have law and order and niggers
too. Vote white. This time vote your convictions by voting white racist J. B.
Stoner into the run-off election for U.S. Senator. Thank you.
Stoner I, supra note 19, at 636.
" See generally Mass Media Bureau Letter to Kaye Scholer, supra note 19
(regarding broadcast of political campaign advertisement containing abortionrelated material).
', See, e.g., Stoner II, supra note 19, at 944-45; Stoner I,supra note 19, at 635
(where NAACP argued that use of the word "nigger" posed an imminent and
immediate threat to the public); see also Mass Media Bureau Letter to Kaye Scholer,
supra note 19.
11 Mass Media Bureau Letter to Kaye Scholer, supra note 19.
77 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (2006). This provision was moved from the Communications
Act to the federal criminal code in 1948.
78 See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 749-50 (1978).
79 See 47 U.S.C. § 503(b)(2)(C) (2006) ("If the violator is... a broadcast
station
licensee

or permittee;.

.

. [and is]

determined ...to have

broadcast

obscene,

indecent, or profane language, the amount of any forfeiture penalty.., shall not
exceed $325,000 for each violation or each day of a continuing violation, except that
the amount assessed for any continuing violation shall not exceed a total of
$3,000,000 for any single act or failure to act."); 47 C.F.R. § 1.80(a)(4), (b)(1) (2010).
In 2006, Congress raised the maximum fine to $325,000 per violation following
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Commission has clearly stated that it does not regulate
indecency on cable or satellite subscription services.8 0
The FCC's indecency rules have undergone significant
judicial review over the last decade."1 Particularly, federal courts
have reviewed an FCC policy change that now punishes the
broadcast of fleeting indecent language and images.8 2 These
courts have, inter alia, considered whether the FCC acted
arbitrarily or capriciously in changing a longstanding rule that
did not punish broadcast of fleeting indecent material.8 3
Additionally, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second and Third
Circuits have addressed the question of whether the new policy of
sanctioning fleeting expletives violates the First Amendment of
the U.S. Constitution. 4
1.

Indecent Material: Fleeting Expletives and Images and the
First Amendment
Indecent programming is "language that describes in terms
patently offensive as measured by contemporary community
standards for the broadcast medium, sexual or excretory

several years of highly publicized indecent broadcast incidents. 47 U.S.C.
§ 503(b)(2)(C)(ii). Previously, the base monetary sanction for violation of the FCC's
indecency, profanity, and/or obscenity restrictions was $7,000 per violation with a
maximum fine of $32,500 per violation. The fine may be adjusted based on such
factors as the nature, circumstances, extent, and gravity of the violation, the degree
of culpability of the violator, the violator's history of prior offenses, the violator's
ability to pay, and such other factors as justice may require. See Industry Guidance
on the Comm'n's Case Law Interpreting 18 U.S.C. 1464 and Enforcement Policies
Regarding Broad. Indecency, 66 Fed. Reg. 21984, 21986 (May 2, 2001); Broadcast
Decency Enforcement Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-235, § 2, 120 Stat. 491 (2006)
(codified as 47 U.S.C. § 503(b)(2)(C)).
80 See Various Complaints Against the
Cable/Satellite Television Program
"Nip/Tuck," 20 F.C.C.R. 4255, 4255-56 (2005). While all services are subject to the
reasonable access, equal opportunity, and censorship rules, albeit to differing
degrees, cable and satellite service providers are not subject to the same rules
governing indecency and profanity as are traditional over-the-air television and
radio broadcast licensees. Obscenity, however, is prohibited on all services at all
times. 47 C.F.R. § 73.3999(a) (2010).
"I See, e.g., FCC v. CBS Corp., 129 S. Ct. 2176 (2009), rev'g, 535 F.3d 167 (3d
Cir. 2008); FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800 (2009), rev'g, 489
F.3d 444 (2d Cir. 2007).
82 See cases cited supra note 81.
'3See cases cited supra note 81.
' See Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, No. 06-1760-ag (2d Cir. Jan. 13,
2010); CBS Corp. v. FCC, No. 06-3575 (3d Cir. Feb. 23, 2010).
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activities and organs."85 It is material intended to pander or
titillate, or that is vulgar or lewd." Although indecent speech
receives First Amendment protection, courts have upheld the
FCC's authority to prohibit television and radio broadcasts of
indecent material during times of the day when there is a
reasonable risk that children will be in the viewing or listening
audience.8 ' Broadcasters may broadcast indecent and profane
material during the safe harbor viewing period of 10:00 p.m. to
6:00 a.m.-those hours of the day when children are less likely to
be in the viewing and listening audience.88 This is called
channeling.
In determining liability for the broadcast of indecent
material, the FCC applies a two-prong test. 89 First, the
Commission will determine whether the speech indeed is
indecent under the Commission's definition of the term.9"
Second, it will consider the context in which the speech arises,
taking into consideration whether it is "patently offensive as
measured by contemporary community standards for the

85 See

Citizen's Complaint Against Pacifica Found. Station WBAI (FM), 56

F.C.C.2d 94, 98 (1975); see also FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 731-32 (1978).
Because the FCC is expressly prohibited from censoring broadcast material, and
because it does not regulate by monitoring broadcast material, the FCC relies almost
exclusively on the viewing and listening public to register complaints regarding
offensive and inappropriate broadcast programming. It is this larger community
standard by which the FCC regulates and reacts to programming alleged by
listeners and viewers to be indecent, obscene, or profane.
' See Pacifica,438 U.S. at 747-48.
87 See, e.g., id. at 749-50; Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654,
669-70 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (en banc) [hereinafter ACT III]; see also United States v.
Playboy Entm't Group, 529 U.S. 803, 811 (2000) ("[Wihen we consider the further
circumstance that the material comes unwanted into homes where children might
see or hear it against parental wishes or consent, there are legitimate reasons for
regulating it."); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 875 (1997) ("It is true that we have
repeatedly recognized the governmental interest in protecting children from harmful
materials.").
See Action for Children'sTelevision, 58 F.3d at 669-70.
89 See Complaints Regarding Various Television Broads. Between Feb. 2, 2002 &
Mar. 8, 2005, 21 F.C.C.R. 13299, 13303-04 (2006) [hereinafter Omnibus Remand
Order].
0 See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 750 (noting that "[c]ontext is all-important" in
indecency determinations); Industry Guidance on the Comm'ns Case Law
Interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 1464 & Enforcement Policies Regarding Broad. Indecency,
16 F.C.C.R. 7999, 8002 (2001) [hereinafter Indecency Policy Statement]; Omnibus
Remand Order, supra note 89.
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broadcast medium."91
To determine whether the material
broadcast is indecent, the FCC looks at three primary factors:
(1) whether the description or depiction is explicit or graphic;
(2)whether the material dwells on or repeats at length
descriptions or depictions of sexual or excretory organs; and
(3) whether the material appears to pander, or is used to titillate
or shock.92 None of these three factors alone is determinative,
but must be balanced to determine whether
the material, taking
93
into consideration its context, is indecent.
Until recently, the prohibition against indecent material has
relied on the U.S. Supreme Court's holding in FCC v. Pacifica
Foundation.94 In that case, the Court was asked to resolve the
question of whether the FCC could fine a broadcaster for airing
during the afternoon daylight hours the twelve-minute "Filthy
Words" monologue by George Carlin in which he identified seven
"words you couldn't say on the public ...airwaves" and then

proceeded to repeat them over and over in various forms.9" The
Court upheld the FCC's authority to regulate broadcast
96

indecency.

The Court in Pacifica acknowledged that the media occupied
"a uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all Americans."97
Furthermore, the Court opined that because "broadcasting is
uniquely accessible to children, even those too young to read,"
broadcasting has the potential to affect them particularly in a
negative way. 98 It can "enlarge[] a child's vocabulary in an
instant."99 Therefore, "the government's interest in the wellbeing of its youth and in supporting parents' claim to authority in
their own household justified the regulation of otherwise
91 Indecency Policy Statement, supra note 90; see Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 750;

Omnibus Remand Order, supra note 89.
' Omnibus Order, supra note 19, at 2668; Indecency Policy Statement, supra
note 90, at 8003; see also Application of Pacifica Found., 95 F.C.C.2d 750, 760-61

(1983) (defining indecency and finding that isolated use of expletives during the
license term "fail[ed] to raise a substantial and material question of fact as to
whether renewal of WPFW's license would serve the public interest, convenience and
necessity").
93Indecency Policy Statement, supra note 90, at 8003.
438 U.S. 726 (1978).
9 Id. at 729.
Id. at 737.
, Id. at 748.
Id. at 749.
9 Id.

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84:199

protected expression."' 0 The holding in Pacifica, however, is not
limited to use of the seven words used by George Carlin in
"Filthy Words." ' Depending on the context in which the speech
is uttered, innuendo and double entendre may be considered
indecent when coupled with other explicit references. 0 2 Pacifica
suggests that channeling indecent broadcasts to the wee hours of
the morning avoids exposing children to material that might be
inappropriate for or harmful to them.0 3
Pacifica has been interpreted to be limited to repeated uses
of indecent material.0 4 Until recently, the Court and the FCC
reasoned that they would focus on deliberate and repetitive use
of expletives and other such language used in a patently
offensive manner.1 05 After thirty years of adherence to this
policy, the FCC changed its policy significantly and has put
broadcast licensees on notice that it no longer will permit the
broadcast of even fleeting and isolated use of profanity.0 6 In Fox
Television Stations, the Supreme Court upheld the FCC's policy
change, which no longer limits its indecency prohibition to
repeated utterances or depictions of indecent material, but also
0 7
sanctions fleeting indecent broadcast material.
A number of complicated and highly politically charged
issues remained unresolved following Fox Television Stations.
The Supreme Court declined to address the First Amendment
implications of the new rule that would sanction fleeting

100Id. (internal quotations omitted).
101See Pacifica Found., Inc., 2 F.C.C.R. 2698, 2699 (1987) [hereinafter Pacifica

M&O].
102
103

See, e.g., Infinity Broad. Corp. of Pa., 2 F.C.C.R. 2705, 2705-06 (1987).
See Pacifica,438 U.S. at 749-51; Citizen's Complaint Against Pacifica Found.

Station WBAI (FM), 56 F.C.C.2d 94, 96 (1975), rev'd, 556 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977),
rev'd, 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
104 Pacifica,438 U.S. at 750.
105 Id.
("We have not decided that an occasional expletive.., would justify any
sanction or... would justify a criminal prosecution."); Pacifica M&O, supra note
101, at 2699.
1' See Complaints Against Various Broad. Licensees Regarding Their Airing of
the "Golden Globe Awards" Program, 19 F.C.C.R. 4975, 4980 (2004) [hereinafter
Golden Globe Order]; Omnibus Order, supra note 19, at 2664; Omnibus Remand
Order, supra note 89, at 13,299. The Commission adopted this policy without
initiating a new rulemaking proceeding.
107 See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1812-13 (2009),
reversing Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444, 455 (2d Cir. 2007)

(addressing the isolated and fleeting use of various forms of the words "shit" and
"fuck" and other profane material).
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expletives and remanded the issue to the Court of Appeals. 0 8
How the federal courts will resolve the First Amendment
challenges to the FCC's current indecency regulatory scheme
remains to be seen. 109
The FCC is caught in a tough position. On the one hand, are
the political pressures from certain constituents and from
concerned persons pressuring the government to preserve some
safe radio spectrum for programming suitable for a young
audience. 110 On the other hand, there are those asserting the
FCC's regulation in this area offends the First Amendment and
who cite to the Supreme Court's holding in Pacifica and the
FCC's longstanding policy against sanctioning fleeting
expletives."'
Also complicating the issue is the disparate
regulation of broadcast and subscription services and the
resulting economic implications of that regulatory disparity.
Some argue that the omnipresence of these services and other
technological advances disputes the continued strict regulation of
broadcast services." 2 They would argue that this disparate
treatment is no longer warranted and indeed is unfair regulation
from an economic perspective. 113 Currently, the overwhelming
majority of television viewers have abandoned reliance on
traditional over-the-air broadcast, choosing instead to subscribe
to either cable or satellite service. That being the case, most
consumers today draw little distinction between broadcast and
subscription services as they all overwhelming are consumed via
cable or satellite services. As such, the relevance of the different
108 See Fox Television Stations, 129 S. Ct. 1800; FCC v. CBS Corp., 129 S. Ct.
2176 (2009).
109Cases have been argued in both the Second and Third Circuits. See Fox
Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, No. 06-1760-ag (2d Cir. Jan. 13, 2010); CBS Corp. v.
FCC, No. 06-3575 (3d Cir. Feb. 23, 2010).
110See Brief of Amici Curiae Focus on the Family & Family Research Council in
Support of Respondents at 11-12, Fox Television Stations, No. 06-1760-ag (Oct. 27,
2009).
111 See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 750; Pacifica M&O, supra note 101, at 2699. See

generally Brief of Petitioners, Fox Television Stations, No. 06-1760-ag (Sept. 16,

2009); Brief of Amicus Curiae American Civil Liberties Union et al. in Support of
Petitioners, Fox Television Stations, No. 06-1760-ag (Sept. 16, 2009) [hereinafter
Brief for ACLU].
112 See Brief of Petitioner Fox Television Stations, Inc., at 52-56, Fox Television
Stations, No. 06-1760-ag (Nov. 12, 2009); Amici Curiae Brief of the Thomas Jefferson
Center for the Protection of Free Expression & the Media Institute at 11, Fox
Television Stations,No. 06-1760-ag (Sept. 16, 2009).
113 See id.
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treatment of broadcast services and subscription services, which
are not subject to the same prohibitions against airing indecent
material, for the purpose of the public interest in protecting
children from indecent material has little continued value or
relevance since indecent material is not prohibited on cable and
satellite channels or on the Internet. Perhaps statutory law and
agency regulations should reflect this market change. Perhaps
the indecency prohibition should apply to all services-broadcast,
4
cable, and satellite service-equally."
On remand to the Second Circuit, amici called for a repeal of
the indecency rules"' or, in the alternative, a return to earlier
FCC policy that would limit sanctions to broadcasts that dwell or
repeat at length prohibited indecent words and images." 6 On
remand, opponents of the new FCC indecency policy raised issues
about the appropriate standard for content-based broadcast
regulation and about the relevance of Pacifica as well as other
Supreme Court and Court of Appeals indecency cases."'
Petitioners and amici objected to the FCC's regulatory policy on
First Amendment grounds."'
They contended that the rules
which take into account the context of the speech are vague,
resulting in a chilling effect due to the self-censoring
broadcasters engage in to avoid violating the FCC's inconsistent
application of the indecency rules." 9 They argued that the rule is
120
not sufficiently tailored to serve the goal of protecting children.
They also pointed to technological advances such as the V-chip
and argue that these advances have made available less
restrictive means of regulating indecent speech. 12 ' The FCC
114 Even the regulatory treatment of the newer technology of mobile television is
uncertain.
11 See Brief for ACLU, supra note 111, at 27-29.
116 See Reply Brief for Petitioners CBS Brodcasting Inc. et al. at 2-4, Fox
Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, No. 06-1760-ag (Nov. 12, 2009).
17 See Reply Brief of Petitioner Fox Television Stations, Inc., supra note 112, at
7-10, Fox Television Stations, No. 06-1760-ag (Nov. 12, 2009). The parties also have
raised issues about scienter. See Brief of Petitioner Fox Television Stations, Inc. at
22-27, Fox Television Stations, No. 06-1760-ag (Sept. 16, 2009); Reply Brief of
Petitioner Fox Television Stations, Inc., supra at 3-6; Brief for Respondents FCC &
United States at 24-26, Fox Television Stations, No. 06-1760-ag (Oct. 28, 2009).
18 See Brief of Petitioner Fox Television Stations, Inc., supra note 117, at 50-57.
19 See Brief for ACLU, supra note 111, at 19-23.

0 See id. at 3-10.

See Brief of Petitioner Fox Television Stations, Inc., supra note 117, at 52-56;
Amici Curiae Brief of the Thomas Jefferson Center for the Protection of Free
Expression & the Media Institute, supra note 112, at 11.
121
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countered that the availability of technological advances does not
change the constitutional analysis. 122
This availability-oftechnology argument cuts both ways. Broadcasters have at their
disposal various technological methods-such as bleeping,
blurring, warnings, disclaimers, and pixulation-to protect the
viewing audience from fleeting indecent material.
Additionally, petitioners argued that broadcasting is no
longer as uniquely pervasive or uniquely accessible by children23
1
as might have been the case when those cases were decided.
Furthermore, they argued that broadcasters are unfairly
disadvantaged in the marketplace that includes unregulated
platforms like cable and satellite service and the Internet. They
argued, therefore, that the basis for regulation found in Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC124 and in Pacifica is no longer

relevant. 125
What follows is a discussion of recent cases that have
brought us to this point in indecency regulation. It explores the
recent and pending cases relevant to adoption and application of
the FCC's new policy of sanctioning fleeting expletives.
a.

2003 "Golden Globe Awards"- FCCAdopts a New Policy

In 2003, musician Bono, upon learning that he had been
awarded a Golden Globe, exclaimed on a live National
Broadcasting Company, Inc. ("NBC") broadcast that his
recognition was "really, really fucking brilliant. Really, really,
great." 126 The FCC's Enforcement Bureau denied the numerous
122 See

Brief for Respondents FCC and United States, supra note 117, at 38-43.
See Brief of Petitioner Fox Television Stations, Inc., supra note 117, at 51-52;
Brief for Petitioners CBS Broadcasting Inc. et al., supra note 116, at 21-27.
124 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
125 See Amici Curiae Brief of the Thomas Jefferson Center for the Protection of
Free Expression & the Media Institute, supra note 112, at 10, (citing Reno v. ACLU,
521 U.S. 844 (1997)) (Internet regulation); see also United States v. Playboy Entm't
Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803 (2000) (cable regulation); Sable Commc'ns of Cal. v. FCC,
492 U.S. 115 (1989) (telephone regulation).
126 Complaints Against Various Broad. Licensees Regarding Their Airing of the
"Golden Globe Awards" Program, 18 F.C.C.R. 19,859 (2003) [hereinafter
Enforcement Bureau Golden Globes Decision]. In 2009, the FCC received a new
round of indecency complaints about NBC's live broadcast of the 2009 Golden Globes
during which a movie director gave the finger to actor Mickey Rourke who was on
stage accepting an award. See Broadcast,COMMC'NS DAILY (Warren Commc'n News,
Washington D.C.), Jan. 21, 2009; Broadcast, COMMC'NS DAILY (Warren Commc'n
News, Washington D.C.), Jan. 14, 2009. The Commission now must grapple with the
question of whether the gesture could be considered indecent.
123
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complaints received in response to the broadcast on the grounds
that Bono's utterance of the word "fucking" was isolated and
fleeting and thus not punishable. 12' The Enforcement Bureau
concluded that, in this case, use of the word "fucking" did not
refer to a sexual act, but was used more as a modifier similar to
using a term like "extremely" or "really."128 The Enforcement
Bureau concluded, therefore, that the speech was not indecent as
defined by the Commission and as supported by a 29long line of
1
FCC policy regarding fleeting uses of such language.
Despite the action by the Enforcement Bureau and the
agency's own long established policy reaffirming that fleeting
expletives uttered on broadcast stations would not be actionable,
the full Commission overturned the bureau's ruling, concluding
that the utterance, while admittedly fleeting was now considered
profane, indecent, and patently offensive under contemporary
community standards. 3 ° The Commission explained that the
word "fuck" and all variations of it, however they are used, have
a sexual connotation. 3 ' It stated further that "the 'F-Word' is
one of the most vulgar, graphic, and explicit descriptions of
sexual activity in the English language," insinuating that all uses
of it describes sexual activity, even if not used literally so. 13 2 The
Commission declined to sanction NBC in this particular
instance because utterances of fleeting expletives were not
actionable at the time Bono uttered them on live television.
Nevertheless, the Commission warned all broadcast licensees
that the Commission would consider any future use of
the "F-word" and all variations of it, even as an "intensifier" or
modifier, to be indecent and profane and thus actionable. 33

Enforcement Bureau Golden Globes Decision, supra note 126, at 19,860-61.
Id.
129 Id.
130 Golden Globe Order, supra note 106, at 4979-81 ("While prior Commission
and staff action have indicated that isolated or fleeting broadcasts of the 'F-Word'
such as that here are not indecent or would not be acted upon, consistent with our
decision today we conclude that any such interpretation is no longer good law.").
127

128

131 Id. at 4979.

Id.
1' Id. at 4978, 4982.
132
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filed
petitions
for
and
other
broadcasters
NBC
reconsideration and a petition to stay the FCC's order. 134 To
date, the FCC has not acted on these petitions pending federal
court decisions on this and other cases, but has applied the
policy
135
adopted in the Golden Globes Order to subsequent cases.
In 2006, the FCC consolidated into one order a response to
four other complaints against various licensees for the following
broadcasts: (1) Fox's "2002 Billboard Music Awards," in which
entertainer Cher stated "I've also had critics for the last 40 years
saying that I was on my way out every year. Right. So fuck 'em.
I still have a job and they don't."; 136 (2) Fox's "2003 Billboard
Music Awards" during which presenter, Nicole Richie, stated
"Have you ever tried to get cow shit out of a Prada purse? It's not
so fucking simple."; 37 (3) several episodes of the ABC network's
weekly hour-long police drama "NYPD Blue," which contained
the words "bullshit," "dick," and "dickhead";' 38 and (4) an episode
of the CBS network's "The Early Show," where a guest during a
39
live morning interview used the word "bullshitter."
The FCC found each of these broadcasts indecent and
profane under the new policy it adopted in the Golden Globes
Order.140 Using the same analysis it used in the Golden Globes
Order, the Commission stated again that any use of any
variation of the word "fuck" is presumed indecent and profane.'
Similarly, any use of "shit" also was determined to be
presumptively indecent and profane. 141
Additionally, the
134

See Brief in Opposition of NBC Universal, Inc. and NBC Telemundo License

Co. at 7, FCC v. Fox Televisions Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800 (2009) (No. 07-582).
135 See id. at 7-8; Omnibus Order, supra note 19, at 2667; Omnibus Remand
Order, supra note 89, at 13,301, 13,304-05. See generally Golden Globe Order, supra

note 106.
1"' Omnibus Order, supra note 19, at 2690 & n.164.
137 Id. at 2691-93.
'3
Id. at 2696.
139 Id. at 2698-99.
140 Id.
at 2690-91, 2693-94, 2696-99. See generally Golden Globe Order, supra
note 106.
141 Omnibus Order, supra note 19, at 2686, 2691; see Golden Globe Order, supra
note 106, at 4979-81.
142 Omnibus Order, supra note 19, at 2696-97, 2699-700. The Commission did
not consider utterances of the word "dick" and its derivative, "dickhead," in the
context they were presented to be patently offensive. Id. at 2696-97. The terms were
not used to describe a sexual organ but rather to denigrate another person. Id. at
2696. Therefore, the use of "dick" and "dickhead" were not found to be indecent. Id.
at 2696-97. The Commission, however, found use of the word "shit" to be patently
offensive as measured by community standards, and thus indecent. Id. at 2697.
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broadcasts were found explicit, shocking, and gratuitous, and
thus, patently offensive. 143 Again, the Commission declined to
issue a forfeiture because the utterances were made when the old
policy that found isolated fleeting expletives neither indecent nor
profane was in effect. 1 " Because of this, the FCC concluded that
the broadcasters did not have adequate notice of the new policy
145
regarding the broadcast of fleeting or isolated expletives.
Fox, CBS, and ABC filed petitions for review of the order.'4 6
On voluntary sixty-day remand, the FCC issued a new order, the
Omnibus Remand Order, addressing these four incidents. 4 7
Rejecting arguments opposing sanctioning isolated and fleeting
utterances, the Omnibus Remand Order vacated in substantial
part the Omnibus Order.4 The FCC reaffirmed its holding that
both the 2002 and 2003 Fox Billboard Music Awards shows
contained indecent and profane material. 49 The "NYPD Blue"
forfeiture was vacated on procedural grounds and the complaint
against ABC was dismissed. 5 °
The Commission reversed its decision regarding "The Early
Show" broadcast.15 ' It concluded that because the use of the word
"bullshitter" on "The Early Show" occurred during a "bona fide
news interview," it was not subject to forfeiture. 2 Although the
FCC has never recognized a formal exception in the indecency
143 Omnibus Order, supra note 19, at 2691, 2694, 2697, 2699.

14 Id. at 2692, 2695, 2698, 2700.
141 Id. at 2700.
146Fox and CBS filed a petition in the Second Circuit. ABC Television Network
("ABC") and Hearst-Argyle Television, Inc. filed a joint petition for review in the
D.C. Circuit. The Second Circuit granted Fox's motion to consolidate these cases.
Omnibus Remand Order, supra note 89, at 13,301.
147See Omnibus Remand Order, supra note 89, at 13,299, 13,302 (addressing
complaints that four television programs contained indecent and profane material).
1- Id. at 13,302.
149 Id. at 13,325 (concluding that Cher's use of the "F-Word" in Fox's broadcast
was patently offensive).
150 Id. at 13,328-29.
151 Id. at 13,328.
112 See id. at 13,326-27 ("[Tlhere is no outright news exemption from our
indecency rules."). The FCC relied on its Indecency Policy Statement which suggests
that context is important and that "[eixplicit language in the context of a bona fide
newscast might not be patently offensive." Indecency Policy Statement, supra note
90, at 8002. Although the FCC has never recognized a formal exception in the
indecency rules for 'bona fide news interviews," the Commission seemed to excuse
the use of the term in that instance. The Commission, however, has never said, nor
did it say in the case of "The Early Show," that it would never act on indecent
material presented in a bona fide news context.
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rules for "bona fide news interviews," the Commission excused

the use of the term "bullshitter" in that instance. 153 The
Commission, however, has never said, nor did it say in the case of
"The Early Show," that it would never act on indecent material
presented in a bona fide news context. Along the same vein, the
FCC has never said that it would never act in the political
advertisement context either.
The Omnibus Remand Order was appealed to the Second
Circuit. 5 1 On appeal, the Second Circuit vacated and remanded
155
the FCC's decision to the Commission for further proceedings.
The Second Circuit found that the agency's new policy on fleeting
expletives "represents a significant departure from positions
previously taken by the agency and relied on by the broadcast
industry."'56 The court also found that the FCC's new policy was
arbitrary and capricious, the agency having failed to provide a
reasoned basis for the policy change.'5 7
The Second Circuit recognized that federal agencies may
revise their rules and policies as they find appropriate, but that
such agency rule and policy changes must be supported by a
"reasoned explanation" of why the new rule or policy is better
than the old rule or policy.' 5 The court concluded that the
Commission failed to offer such a reasoned explanation for its
new policies on either fleeting expletives or profanity." 9
Moreover, the Second Circuit rejected the FCC's argument that
fleeting expletives must not be exempted from a finding of
indecency because to do so would "unfairly force[ I] viewers
(including children) to take 'the first blow'" referred to by the

"5

See Omnibus Remand Order, supra note 89, at 13,326-27.

15 Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444 (2d Cir. 2007), rev'd, 129 S.

Ct. 1800 (2009).
"' Id. at 467.
156Id. at 447. In 2001, the Commission attempted to provide broadcasters with

guidance on its indecency enforcement policy. The Commission excepted fleeting
expletives and sexual references from indecency enforcement action. The agency also
stressed the importance of taking potentially indecent material in proper context.
Indecency Policy Statement, supra note 90, at 8016-17.
157Fox Television Stations, 489 F.3d at 447.
158Id. at 456-57.
"' Id. at 460-62.
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Court in Pacifica.6 ' The Court in Pacifica, it held, made it clear
that it was not offering an opinion on fleeting utterances of
161
profanity.
The Second Circuit struggled to reconcile the Commission's
nearly thirty years of acquiescence to the problem of the
proverbial "first blow" with its newfound concern about fleeting
expletives.162 Specifically, the Second Circuit found that the FCC
did not provide a "reasonable explanation for why it has changed
its perception that a fleeting expletive was not a harmful 'first
blow' for the nearly thirty years between Pacifica and Golden
Globes."'6 ' The court found that the FCC failed to produce any
evidence that a fleeting expletive is harmful. Additionally, the
exceptions the Commission seemed to carve out appeared to
undercut its concerns about the "first blow." The Commission's
treatment of the material presented in "The Early Show" as
excusable because it appeared in a bona fide news interview, as
well as its excuse of the expletives that were considered
"integral" to a work, such as those that appeared in the movies
"Saving Private Ryan" and "Schindler's List," indeed forced
viewers to take the first blow.' 64 The Second Circuit found that
the FCC failed to support its "first blow" theory in light of these
gaping holes. 6 Nor could the decision in "Saving Private Ryan"
be reconciled with the decision in "The Blues: Godfathers and
Sons," where the FCC issued a Notice of Apparent Liability
1woFCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978); Omnibus Remand Order,
supra note 89, at 13,309. The first blow analogy suggests that while a listener or
viewer may elect to turn off the television or radio or switch the channel after
hearing offensive language, listeners and viewers should not have to be subjected to
this proverbial "first blow," but that FCC rules may prohibit the utterance or
depiction of indecent, profane, or obscene material altogether. In doing so, viewers
and listeners are spared suffering the needless first blow.
161 Pacifica,438 U.S. at 750.
162 Fox Television Stations, 489 F.3d at 457-58. The Court in Pacifica rejected
the argument that "one may avoid further offense by turning off the radio when he
hears indecent language." 438 U.S. at 748-49.
16 Fox Television Stations, 489 F.3d at 457-58; see Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726;
Golden Globe Order, supra note 106, at 4975.
164 See Fox Television Stations, 489 F.3d at 458-59; Complaints Against Various
Television Licensees Regarding Their Broad. on Nov. 11, 2004, of the ABC Television
Network's Presentation of the Film "Saving Private Ryan," 20 F.C.C.R. 4507, 451213 (2005) [hereinafter Saving Private Ryan Complaint]. "Saving Private Ryan" is a
dramatic movie about combat soldiers in World War II. "Schindler's List" is a drama
based on the real life experiences of a German businessman and Jews enslaved by
Nazis during World War IlI.
'" Fox Television Stations, 489 F.3d at 458-59.
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under seemingly similar circumstances. 166 Because the FCC did
not prohibit the broadcast of all expletives, the court could not
find support for this new policy. 167 The court also disagreed with
the FCC's conclusion that the "F-word" has an inescapable sexual
connotation, pointing out that the word often is used in casual
daily conversation without a sexual meaning. 168 This case was
appealed to the United States Supreme Court, which granted the
169
FCC's and U.S. government's petition for writ of certiorari.
The issue on appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court was
"[wihether the court of appeals erred in striking down the FCC's
determination that the broadcast of vulgar expletives may violate
federal restrictions on the broadcast of 'any obscene, indecent, or
profane language,' even when the uttered expletives are not
70
repeated."'
Petitioners, the FCC and the U.S. government, argued that
the Second Circuit's opinion conflicts with the Court's holding in
Pacifica.171 Petitioners seemed to concede that pursuant to
Pacifica and Commission decisions, when "a complaint focuses
solely on the use of expletives, . . . repetitive use in a patently
offensive manner is a requisite to a finding of indecency. 172 But,
they contended that when offensive language involves not just
6 See Omnibus Order, supra note 19, at 2686 (issuing Notice of Apparent
Liability for Forfeiture for Broadcast of "The Blues: Godfathers and Sons," a blues
documentary); see also Brief for ACLU, supra note 111.
167 See Fox Television Stations, 489 F.3d at 456-58. The Second Circuit did
acknowledge the warning in Pacifica that a total ban on expletives would raise
significant constitutional questions. Id. at 457-58.
' Id. at 459-60.
169 FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 128 S.Ct. 1647 (2008).
170 See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 1, FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc.,
129 S. Ct. 1800 (2009) (No. 07-582) (citation omitted) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1464
(2006)); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (2006); 47 C.F.R. § 73.3999 (2010). Respondents
Fox Television Stations, Inc., CBS Broadcasting Inc., and ABC, Inc. have framed the
issue as "[wihether the court of appeals correctly held as a matter of administrative
law that the FCC failed to provide a reasoned basis for reversing its longstanding
indecency enforcement policy with respect to isolated and fleeting expletives." Brief
in Opposition of Respondents Fox Television Stations, Inc. et al. at (i), Fox Television
Stations, 129 S.Ct. 1800 (No. 07-582). Respondent NBC Universal, Inc. and NBC
Telemundo License Company frame the issue as "[w]hether the court of appeals
erred in holding that the Commission had failed to explain adequately the abrupt
reversal of its longstanding determination that fleeting and isolated utterances of
expletives generally fall outside the Commission's definition of broadcast indecency."
Brief in Opposition of NBC Universal, Inc. and NBC Telemundo License Co., supra
note 134, at (i).
171 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 170, at 15.
172 Pacifica M&O, supra note 101, at 2699.

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84:199

expletives, but describes sexual or excretory functions,
"repetition of specific words or phrases is not necessarily an
element critical to a determination of indecency. "173
The
Commission, it argued, had established that determinations of
patent offensiveness are fact specific. 7 4 In determining whether
material is patently offensive, it will consider the "full context" of
the broadcast. 175 The Commission claimed in its petition for writ
of certiorari, therefore, that even fleeting references may be
found indecent if other factors such as graphic language or
explicit language "contributing to a finding of patent
1 76
offensiveness" are present.
Petitioners argued further that the Second Circuit imposed
"hurdles" in supporting its changed policy that "find no support
in the Administrative Procedure Act.' 7 7 They argued that the
agency must continually review its policies, and that it may
make policy changes where "prior polic[ies] failed to implement
properly the statute."1 78 The failure the agency alleged was the
drawing of "an artificial distinction between expletives and
descriptions or depictions of sexual or excretory activity" despite
the fact that "an expletive's power to offend derives from its
1 79
sexual or excretory meaning."
At the heart of respondents' argument was that the
Administrative Procedure Act requires that the FCC justify, by a
more reasoned explanation, the decision to change a thirty-year
old policy not to consider fleeting expletives to fall within the
definition of indecency.' 80 Respondents, seeking to uphold the
Second Circuit's decision, argued, first, that there is no conflict

Id.
See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 170, at 4.
Indecency Policy Statement, supra note 90, at 8002-03.
11 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 170, at 5 (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting Indecency Policy Statement, supra note 90, at 8008-09).
177 Id. at 21; see also 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006).
178 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 170, at 22 (quoting Rust v.
Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 187 (1991)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
179 Omnibus Remand Order, supra note 89, at 22 (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted).
1s0 See Brief in Opposition of Respondents Fox Television Stations Inc. et al.,
supra note 170, at 2; Brief in Opposition of NBC Universal, Inc. and NBC
Telemundo License Co., supra note 134, at 1 (citing Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n
v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 981 (2005)).
173
174
175
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between the Second Circuit's decision and Pacifica.81 Second,
respondents argued that the Second Circuit's decision was
consistent with administrative law principles and other
precedent including ACT 111.182 Finally, they argued that the
Second Circuit's remand to the FCC did not warrant the Court's
review.

83

The U.S. Supreme Court, in Fox Television Stations, was
presented with a twist of the possibility of the dilemma described
in this Article. 8
In questioning respondents' counsel, Justice
Breyer sought examples of some of the practical problems facing
small broadcasters in applying available technology such as tape
181 See Brief in Opposition of Respondents Fox Television Stations, Inc. et al.,
supra note 170, at 10; Brief in Opposition of NBC Universal, Inc. and NBC
Telemundo License Co., supra note 134, at 23.
182 Brief in Opposition of Respondents Fox Television Stations, Inc. et al., supra
note 170, at 14; Brief in Opposition of NBC Universal, Inc. and NBC Telemundo
License Co., supra note 170, at 15. In ACT III, the D.C. Circuit rejected arguments
that the FCC's indecency definition was vague and overbroad. Action for Children's
Television v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654, 659 (D.C. Cir. 1995). Additionally, the D.C. Circuit
upheld the FCC's policy of channeling indecent material to the safe harbor, but
disagreed with the disparate application of the safe harbor to stations that signed off
at or before midnight and all other broadcast stations. The court, therefore, directed
the FCC to enlarge the safe harbor hours to include the hours from 10:00 p.m. to
6:00 a.m. instead of midnight to 6:00 a.m. The D.C. Circuit in earlier cases had also
upheld the FCC's indecency regulation. See, e.g., Action for Children's Television v.
FCC, 932 F.2d 1504, 1508 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (holding that indecent material is
afforded First Amendment protection as long as it is channeled); Action for
Children's Television v. FCC, 852 F.2d 1332, 1334 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (upholding FCC's
definition of indecency, but concluding that the Commission did not adequately
justify its channeling approach, which curtails the hours when nonobscene programs
containing indecent speech may be broadcast). The D.C. Circuit, in ACT III, held
that scientific evidence of harm to children was not necessary to show a compelling
governmental interest. Action for Children'sTelevision, 58 F.3d at 662. ACT III dealt
with pornographic material, not fleeting expletives.
1' Respondents also argued that the Commission's definition of indecency is
unconstitutionally vague, tending to chill large amounts of speech. Respondents
cited the lenient standard applied in the Saving Private Ryan case in which the
Commission was deferential to the artistic freedom of the filmmaker and the subject
matter-war-and contrasting that with the lack of deference shown the filmmaker
in a documentary about blues music. See Omnibus Order, supra note 19, at 2685-87
(issuing notice of apparent liability for forfeiture for broadcast of "The Blues:
Godfathers and Sons," a blues documentary); Saving Private Ryan Complaint, supra
note 164, at 4512-14; see also Brief in Opposition of Respondents Fox Television
Stations, Inc. et al., supra note 170, at 6; Brief in Opposition of NBC Universal, Inc.
and NBC Telemundo License Co., supra note 134, at 29. In 1997, the Court struck
down a similar indecency standard in the Communications Decency Act, finding the
standard unconstitutionally vague. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 874 (1997).
184 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 52-54, FCC v. Fox Television Stations,
Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800 (2009) (No. 07-582).
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delays. 8 ' Counsel for respondent offered an example in which a
public station in Vermont refused to broadcast a debate or to
allow a candidate to participate in a debate because the
candidate was known to have used expletives in earlier public
forums."8 6 The station did not want to take the chance that the
candidate would utter an expletive on air when the station did
not have and could not afford the tape delay technology that
could have87 prevented any expletives from going out over the
airwaves. 1

The Court's decision in the fleeting expletives case, however,
did not better define what constitutes indecent material or the
extent to which fleeting images or other isolated sexual content
in political campaign advertisements actually triggers the
statutory conflict in question here. 188 Furthermore, as discussed
herein, the Court remanded to the Second Circuit the issue of
whether the policy 89of sanctioning fleeting expletives offends the
First Amendment. 1

b.

JanetJackson and the Bare Breast: CBS Corp. v. FCC
Pending at the Third Circuit is the case involving the alleged
wardrobe malfunction at the 2004 Super Bowl halftime show
featuring musical performers Janet Jackson and Justin
Timberlake. The year 2004 marked the now infamous CBS live
television broadcast of Super Bowl XXXVIII, when during the
halftime show featuring musical performers Janet Jackson and
Justin Timberlake, an apparent "wardrobe malfunction" resulted
in Jackson's bare breast being exposed on screen for a fraction of
a second. 9 ° That fraction of a second of exposure of Jackson's
185 See id.
'86

See id.

'87 See id.

18 Fox Television Stations, 129 S. Ct. at 1811-13.
189

Id.

190See, e.g., Complaints Against Various Television Licensees Concerning Their
Feb. 1, 2004 Broad. of the Super Bowl XXXVIII Halftime Show, Notice of Apparent
Liability for Forfeiture, 19 F.C.C.R. 19,230, 19,230, 19,235 (2004) [hereinafter Super
Bowl NALI, af/d, Complaints Against Various Television Licensees Concerning
Their Feb. 1, 2004 Broad. of the Super Bowl XXXVIII Halftime Show, Forfeiture
Order, 21 F.C.C.R. 2760 (2006) [hereinafter Super Bowl Forfeiture Order], affd,
Complaints Against Various Television Licensees Concerning Their Feb. 1, 2004
Broad. of the Super Bowl XXXVIII Halftime Show, Order on Reconsideration, 21
F.C.C.R. 6653 (2006), [hereinafter Super Bowl Order on Reconsideration], vacated,
CBS Corp. v. FCC, 535 F.3d 167 (3d Cir. 2008), vacated, FCC v. CBS Corp., 129 S.
Ct. 2176 (2009). Jackson's bare breast was on the screen for a mere nine-sixteenths
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bare breast resulted in an "unprecedented number of complaints"
to the FCC.'91
Upon review, the FCC found the performance indecent and
issued a forfeiture in the amount of $550,000 against all of CBS's
twenty locally owned affiliates. 19 2
First, the Commission
determined that the Super Bowl XXXVIII broadcast fell within
193
the subject matter scope of the FCC's definition of indecency.
The broadcast, which was aired outside the safe harbor, was
found to depict "sexual or excretory organs or activities"-the
bare breast.9 On the determination of patent offensiveness, the
FCC considered the Janet Jackson breast reveal in the context of
the entire halftime show and concluded that the entire halftime
show was "patently offensive as measured by contemporary
community standards for the broadcast medium." 95 Besides the
duo performance by Jackson and Timberlake, the halftime show
included performances by other artists who sang songs with
sexual innuendo and who danced suggestively. 9 6 The depiction
of a second. See Brief of Petitioners CBS Corp. et al. at 3, CBS Corp., 535 F.3d 167
(No. 06-3575). In 2009, yet another Super Bowl-related incident raised eyebrows and
could result in FCC enforcement action. Somewhere between ten to thirty seconds of
a male pornographic video program interrupted the live feed of the Super Bowl to
Comcast cable customers in Tucson, Arizona. See Brian J. Pedersen, Super Bowl
Porn Clip 'a MaliciousAct,' ARIZ. DAILY STAR, Feb. 3, 2009, at Al. The broadcaster
confirmed the incident, but contended that the pornography was not included in the
feed when it dispensed the signal to cable operators. See id.
191Super Bowl NAL, supra note 190, at 19,231. The actual number of complaints
received by the Commission is in dispute, as a significant percentage of the
complaints received were either duplicates or form complaints generated by a small
number of special interest groups.
192 Id.
at 19,230, 19,240, 19,242. At the time, the maximum indecency fine was
$27,500. See id. at 19,230. The twenty CBS-owned affiliates were fined the
maximum $27,500 for the broadcast. Id. at 19,230, 19,240, 19,242. The FCC
reaffirmed the $550,000 forfeiture on remand. See Super Bowl Forfeiture Order,
supra note 190, at 2778. Later in 2006, the FCC denied a petition for reconsideration
of the case. See Super Bowl Order on Reconsideration, supra note 190, at 6653.
193 See Super Bowl Forfeiture Order, supra note 190, at 2771-72.
"I See id. at 2764-65 (quoting Industry Guidance on the Comm'ns Case Law
Interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 1464 & Enforcement Policies Regarding Broad. Indecency,
16 F.C.C.R. 7999, 8002 (2001) (policy statement)).
195See id. at 2765.

11 See id. at 2766. During the performance, Timberlake and Jackson danced and
teased one another. See Brief of Respondents at 10-11, CBS Corp. v. FCC, 535 F.3d
167 (3d Cir. 2008) (No. 06-3575). Timberlake grabbed Jackson, rubbed against her
body, and slapped her buttocks. Id. All the while, he pleaded with Jackson to let him
"rock your body" and "just let me rock you 'til the break of day." Id. at 11. Then, as
he peeled off her brassiere, he sang "gonna have you naked by the end of this song."
Id.
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of the nude breast was found to be graphic and explicit.1 9 v While
the agency determined that the material did not dwell or repeat
at length on the exposure of the nude breast and was merely a
fleeting image, the FCC concluded that "even relatively fleeting
references may be found indecent where other factors contribute
to a finding of patent offensiveness."198
As for the third factor in the test for patent offensiveness
determinations, the FCC concluded that the skillfully
choreographed routine of Jackson and Timberlake in the context
of the entire halftime show did have the effect of titillating,
pandering to, and shocking the viewing audience who had no
prior warning of what was to come during this performance. 99
So, even though the depiction of the nude female breast was
found to be fleeting in nature, the Commission found that the
other two factors used to determine whether broadcast material
is patently offensive outweighed the lack of dwelling and
repetition of the depiction of the nude breast. °° It was graphic,
explicit, tending to titillate, pander, and shock. 0 1 Thus, the
material, which was aired outside the safe harbor, fell within the
FCC's definition of indecency and was patently offensive as
measured by contemporary community standards for the
broadcast medium.0 2
Additionally, the FCC found that the performance aired by
CBS and its affiliates was "willful."20 3 The Commission made
such a determination not because CBS consciously broadcast the
nude breast but because the network "consciously and
deliberately failed to take reasonable precautions to ensure that
no actionably indecent material was broadcast."20 4 The FCC
197 See

Super Bowl Forfeiture Order, supra note 190, at 2765-66.
Id. at 2766 (quoting Indecency Policy Statement, supra note 90, at 8009); see
also Comm'n Proposes To Fine Young Broad. of San Francisco, Inc., Statutory
Maximum for Apparent Violation of Indecency Rules, 2004 WL 135946, at *1 (Jan.
27, 2004); Tempe Radio, Inc., 12 F.C.C.R. 21,828, 21,828 (1997) (forfeiture paid);
LBJS Broad. Co., 13 F.C.C.R. 20,956, 20,957 (1998) (forfeiture paid). But see FCC v.
Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 750 (1978). See generally Indecency Policy Statement,
supra note 90, at 8009.
'o See Super Bowl Forfeiture Order, supra note 190, at 2766-67.
200 See id. at 2767; Super Bowl NAL, supra note 190, at 19,236.
201 See Super Bowl Forfeiture Order, supra note 190, at 2767.
198

202 See id.
202 See id. at 2767-68; Brief of Respondents, supra note 196, at 38-39.
24 Super Bowl Forfeiture Order, supra note 190, at 2768; Brief of Respondents,

supra note 196, at 15.
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found that CBS had failed to take precautions to prevent the
indecent broadcast despite knowledge prior to the broadcast that
the halftime show would include "some shocking moments."2 °5
CBS was found fully responsible under the doctrine of respondeat
superior for the actions of the performers and the choreographer
of the performance.20 6
CBS appealed the FCC's decision to the Third Circuit, which
vacated the Commission's orders and remanded for further
2 7 On appeal, there
proceedings.
were two significant issues. The
first issue was whether the FCC acted arbitrarily and
capriciously in applying a new policy that permitted a finding
that the fleeting image of Jackson's nude breast was indecent
and thus actionable.20 8
CBS argued that the Commission
violated the Administrative Procedure Act by not providing a
reasoned explanation for its deviation from a longstanding policy
not to act on isolated or fleeting material.2 9
The second issue was whether the Commission, applying
theories of respondeat superior, vicarious liability, and the
willfulness standard in the indecency statute, properly found
CBS had violated the indecency prohibition. 20 At issue was
whether CBS intended to broadcast indecent material and
whether it knew that Jackson and Timberlake were planning a
wardrobe reveal.2"1'
Specifically, on appeal, CBS argued that: (1) the FCC's
forfeiture order violated the First Amendment under Pacifica;
(2) the FCC violated its policy of only fining repeated or extended
presentations of indecent material; (3) the FCC's action violated
due process and was arbitrary and capricious, specifically, the
new standard the FCC currently asserts was not in place at the
time of the Super Bowl, thus failing to give notice and, therefore,
Super Bowl Forfeiture Order, supra note 190, at 2769 (internal quotations
omitted).
201 Id. at 2772. The halftime show was produced by MTV and was choreographed
by a Jackson choreographer. Id. at 2769.
207 See CBS Corp. v. FCC, 535 F.3d 167, 171 (3d Cir. 2008); Brief of Petitioners,
supra note 190, at 58.
208 See CBS Corp., 535 F.3d at 171.
-o
See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006); CBS Corp., 535 F.3d at 171.
210 See CBS Corp., 535 F.3d at 171.
211 See Brief of Petitioners, supra note 190, at 28-29. Jackson and Timberlake
both admitted that CBS and MTV knew nothing about their planned performance
and that the stunt unfortunately just went terribly wrong from what they had
planned. See id. at 6-7.
205
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the FCC should have vacated the forfeiture for the same reasons
it did in the subsequent fleeting expletive cases pursuant to its
decision in the Omnibus Order;212 and (4) the FCC did not
measure contemporary community standards.213
In response, the FCC argued that its indecency orders and
rules are constitutional.
The agency attempted to draw a
distinction between the fleeting images in this case and its prior
decisions regarding fleeting expletives .214
The Commission
argued that its longstanding policy of restraint in acting on
isolated and fleeting material was limited to fleeting expletives,
and did not extend to the fleeting images in question during the
Super Bowl XXXIII Halftime Show.215
Broadcasting, the
Commission asserted, has only limited First Amendment
protection, the government's interests are substantial, and the
indecency rules are narrowly tailored to those interests. 21 6

It

offered concern about subjecting viewers to the "first blow" of
indecent material as an explanation for its change of policy
regarding fleeting material.1 7
The Third Circuit ruled against the FCC. The Third Circuit
found that the FCC acted arbitrarily and capriciously in its
departure from its policy excepting fleeting material from the
scope of its indecency action.18 While not foreclosing declaratory
action, the court made clear that the FCC may not penalize CBS
retroactively under this new rule, which it had adopted in the
later decided Golden Globes case. 2 9 The FCC petitioned the U.S.
Supreme Court for certiorari but asked the Court to hold the

See id. at 25-28, 35-39. See generally Omnibus Order, supra note 19, at 2664.
See Brief of Petitioners, supra note 190, at 40-45.
214 See CBS Corp., 535 F.3d at 183-84.
215 See Brief of Respondents, supranote 196, at 28-29.
216 See id. at 52-58.
217 See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 170, at 10.
211 CBS Corp., 535 F.3d at 209. Additionally, the Third Circuit found that the
FCC could not impose liability on CBS for the acts of Jackson and Timberlake
"under a proper application of vicarious liability and in light of the First Amendment
requirement that the content of speech or expression not be penalized absent a
showing of scienter." Id. The lack of scienter also was central to Fox's argument that
the FCC's new indecency policy violates the First Amendment. See Reply Brief of
Petitioner at 15-17, FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 489 F.3d 444 (2d Cir. 2007)
(No. 06-1760-ag).
219 CBS Corp., 535 F.3d at 178-81; see Golden Globe Order, supra note 106.
212
213

20101

POLITCAL ADVERTISEMENTS

petition in abeyance, pending the Court's decision in Fox
Television Stations. 220 The case is pending decision by the Third
Circuit. 221
c.

"NYPD Blue"

On February 19, 2008, the FCC issued a forfeiture order
against the ABC Television Network and certain affiliated
stations issuing a fine in the amount of $27,500.222 The NYPD
Blue Forfeiture Order sanctioned ABC's 9:00 p.m. broadcast of an
episode of the police drama, which depicted a woman's naked
buttocks, and a portion of her naked breast.2 2 3 In the scene, the
woman's naked body was shown while she was taking a shower
and as an eight-year-old boy looked on.224 The female's naked
body parts were not obscured, blurred, or pixilated. 5 The FCC
cited the repeated shots of the woman's naked buttocks and the
deliberate panning of the camera down her back "to reveal
another full view of her buttocks before panning up again" to
create a "voyeuristic" vantage point.226 The FCC also cited
another camera shot in which the young boy's shocked face is
depicted from between the naked woman's legs.227
In its NYPD Blue Forfeiture Order, the Commission affirmed
its earlier decisions and concluded that the depiction of the naked
female buttocks in the "NYPD Blue" episode squarely came
within the subject matter scope of its indecency definition in that

220 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 24, FCC v. CBS Corp., 129 S. Ct. 2176
(2009) (No. 08-653); see Fox Television Stations, 129 S. Ct. 1800; John Eggerton,

FCC, DOJ Appeal Janet Jackson to Supreme Court, BROADCASTING & CABLE, Nov.

21, 2008, http:/www.broadcastingcable.com/article/96987-FCC-DOJ_AppealJanet_
Jackson To SupremeCourt.php.
221 Oral arguments in the case were heard on February 23, 2010.
222 Complaints Against Various Television Licensees Concerning Their Feb. 25,
2003 Broad. of the Program "NYPD Blue," 23 F.C.C.R. 3147, 3168 (2008)
[hereinafter NYPD Blue Forfeiture Order]. The FCC imposed the fine only on those
ABC affiliates about which the agency had received complaints resulting from the
broadcast of the material outside the safe harbor. The FCC previously had issued a
Notice of Apparent Liability for Forfeiture in the case. See Complaints Against
Various Television Licensees Concerning Their Feb. 25, 2003 Broad. of the Program
"NYPD Blue," 23 F.C.C.R. 1596 (2008) [hereinafter NYPD Blue NAL].
223 NYPD Blue Forfeiture Order, supra note 222, at 3148.
224 NYPD Blue NAL, supra note 222, at 1598-99.
2*5 NYPD Blue Forfeiture Order, supra note 222, at 3152. Pixilation is a popular
method used to distort the resolution of an image in order to obscure it.
22

Id.

227

Id. at 3 153-54.

at 3153.

238
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it described or depicted sexual or excretory organs or activities.228
Despite the fact that the buttocks is not necessarily biologically
an excretory organ, the FCC has consistently concluded that it is
an excretory organ for the purposes of satisfying its indecency
definition. 229 The FCC stated in the NYPD Blue Forfeiture Order
that "the buttocks, which, though not physiologically necessary to
procreation or excretion, are widely associated with sexual
arousal and closely associated by most people with excretory
activities .230
Reviewing the context of the material in the episode and
whether the material was patently offensive as measured by
contemporary community standards, the FCC concluded that
"notwithstanding any artistic or social merit and the presence of
a parental advisory and rating," the material was "patently
offensive under the community standards for the broadcast
medium."23 1
In reaching this conclusion, the FCC first
determined that the depiction of the naked buttocks in this case
was sufficiently graphic and explicit to support a finding of
232
indecency.
Next, the FCC also found that the repeated camera shots of
the woman's naked buttocks, while not as egregious as some
cases the agency had reviewed, certainly rendered the episode
more offensive than many cases the Commission had previously
found not patently offensive. 233 The FCC acknowledged that the
depiction in the "NYPD Blue" episode was not as lengthy or as
repetitive as some indecency cases where there had been a
finding of patent offensiveness, but that it did contain "lengthier
depictions of nudity, or more focus on nudity, than other cases
involving nudity where the Commission has found that this
factor did not weigh in favor of a finding of patent
offensiveness." 234
Finally, in applying the third factor in
determining whether material is patently offensive, the FCC
concluded that the scene was pandering, titillating, and shocking

228 See id. at 3149.
229 See id. at 3150 & n.28.
230 Id. at 3150.
231 Id. at 3155.
232 Id. at 3152.
233 See id. at 3153.
234

Id.
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because of the voyeuristic camera shots that panned up and
down the back of the woman's naked body.23 This case has been
appealed to the Second Circuit.23 6
d.

"Marriedby America"

On February 22, 2008, the FCC issued a forfeiture order
against a number of Fox affiliated stations for the broadcast of
the reality show "Married by America."237 The forfeiture, in the
amount of $7,000 per station, sanctioned Fox's broadcast prior to
10:00 p.m. of the reality show featuring bachelor and
bachelorette parties for two couples, all of whom prior to the
show were strangers, but whom America by vote paired to be
married on the show.2 38 The bachelor and bachelorette parties
for the couples featured "sexually oriented" and suggestive
performances by male and female strippers.23 9
The various scenes cited by the FCC in its "Married by
America" forfeiture order included depictions of nude and seminude female and male adult entertainers grinding their crotches
with partygoers, smearing and licking whipped cream from
various body parts, seductively kissing breasts and other body
parts, spanking partygoers with whips and belts, providing
suggestive and seductive lap dances, and engaging in other
sexually suggestive behavior. 24" The FCC concluded that the
depictions-many of which were pixilated to obscure naked body
parts, such as buttocks, breasts, and genitals-were designed "to
Id.
ABC, Inc. v. FCC, No. 08-0841-ag (2d Cir. filed Mar. 26, 2008).
23 Complaints Against Various Licensees Regarding Their Broad. of the Fox
Television Network Program "Married by America" on Apr. 7, 2003, 23 F.C.C.R.
3222, 3222 (2008) [hereinafter Married by America Forfeiture Order]. A Notice of
Apparent Liability for Forfeiture had been issued previously on October 12, 2004.
Complaints Against Various Licensees Regarding Their Broad. of the Fox Television
Network Program "Married by America" on Apr. 7, 2003, 19 F.C.C.R. 20191, 20191
(2004) [hereinafter Married by America NAL]. The Enforcement Bureau denied a
petition for reconsideration. Complaints Against Various Licensees Regarding Their
Broad. of the Fox Television Network Program "Married by America" on Apr. 7,
2003, 23 F.C.C.R. 5699, 5699 (2008) [hereinafter Married by America
Reconsideration Order].
23' See Married by America Forfeiture Order, supra note 237, at 3223; see also
Courtney Livingston Quale, Hear an [Expletive], There an [Expletive], But[t]... the
Federal Communications Commission Will Not Let You Say an [Expletive], 45
WniLAMETTE L. REv. 207, 210 (2008).
23' See Married by America Forfeiture Order, supra note 237, at 3223.
240 Id. at 3224, 3227.
235
26
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stimulate sexual arousal."241 The Commission found the material
"sufficiently graphic and explicit to support an indecency
finding."2 42 In the forfeiture order, the FCC stated that the fact
that naked body parts were pixilated "did not obscure the overall
graphic character of the depiction" and determined
that the
2 43
material should be assessed "in its full context."
Fox refused to pay the $91,000 forfeiture, which has been
reduced from the nearly $1.2 million originally imposed, and
asked the Commission for reconsideration. 4 4
Borrowing
language from the court of appeals, Fox called the fine "arbitrary
and capricious, inconsistent with precedent, and patently
unconstitutional."245
The FCC refused to reconsider on
2
46
procedural grounds.
The U.S. Department of Justice has
weighed in, filing suit in the D.C. Circuit, the Southern District
of Iowa, the Southern District of West Virginia, and the Middle
District of Tennessee against eight Fox affiliates to recover the
$7,000 forfeiture against each.24 7 The resolution of these cases
likely will be influenced at least in part by the Supreme Court's
decision in Fox Television Stations.2 48
e.

"Without a Trace"
In 2006, the FCC issued a Notice of Apparent Liability for
Forfeiture against numerous CBS network affiliates for the
December 31, 2004 broadcast of an episode of "Without a Trace,"

241 Id.
242

at 3225.

Id. at 3226.

Id.
Press Release, Scott Grogin, Senior Vice President of Corporate Comm'ns,
Fox Broad. Co. (Mar. 24, 2008) (on file with author); see also Frank Ahrens, Fox
Refuses To Pay FCC Indecency Fine, WASH. POST, Mar. 25, 2008, at D01. The
$91,000 forfeiture was to be paid by March 22, 2008. Upon receipt of a forfeiture,
licensees generally have two options available: (i) pay and appeal the fine, or (ii) do
not pay the fine and later mount a defense in a trial de novo should the government
seek to collect the amount of the forfeiture. See Bryan N. Tramont, Too Much Power,
Too Little Restraint: How the FCC Expands Its Reach Through Unenforceable and
243

244

Unwieldy "Voluntary"Agreements, 53 FED. COMMC'Ns L.J. 49, 64 (2000).
241 Ahrens,
"
'

supra note 244 (internal quotation marks omitted).
See Married by America Reconsideration Order, supra note 237, at 5699.
See John Eggerton, FCC Kicks Back Fox's Married by America Appeal,

BROADCASTING

&

CABLE,

Apr.

4,

2008,

http'Jwww.broadcastingcable.com/

article/113150-FCC KicksBackFoxs_Married byAmericaAppeal.php.
M 129 S. Ct. 1800 (2009).
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which depicted teenagers engaged in sexual acts.24 9 The episode
involved "an FBI investigation into the disappearance and
possible rape of a high school student."2 5 ° In a flashback scene,
viewers were taken back to the scene of a teenage sex party that
included depictions of couples and groups of teenagers engaged in
various sex acts. 25 1 There was no actual nudity, but teenagers
were depicted partially unclothed.2 52
The scene depicted
intercourse between the teenagers.25 3 The final scene in the
flashback depicted the victim in a bra and panties straddling a
male.2 54 Two other males were kissing her breasts and the victim
was moving up and down on the male who was shown thrusting
his hips into the victim's crotch.2 55
Even though there was no actual nudity, the FCC concluded
that the depiction of sexual activity was shocking, intended to
titillate, and patently offensive under contemporary community
standards.25 6
The FCC proposed a fine totaling $3,633,500
against the CBS affiliates. 25 71 As demonstrated, herein, the status
of the constitutionality of the fleeting expletives and images
policy is very much unsettled with the aforementioned cases as
well as many others pending resolution either in the courts or at
the Commission.
2.

Profane Material

Traditionally, the courts and the FCC defined profanity as
blasphemy. 258 The Commission adopted a new definition in 2004
in its Golden Globes Order, which broadened the definition of
249 See Complaints Against Various Television Licensees Concerning Their Dec.
31, 2004 Broad. of the Program "Without a Trace," 21 F.C.C.R. 2732, 2732 (2006)
[hereinafter Without a Trace NAL].
210 Id. at 2735.
251
252
253
254
255
256

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at

2235-36.

Id. at 2759 (Attachment A). The Notice of Apparent Liability for Forfeiture
later was cancelled against eight licensees. See Complaints Against Various
Television Licensees Concerning Their Dec. 31, 2004 Broad. of the Program
"Without A Trace," 21 F.C.C.R. 3110 (2006).
' See Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444, 452 (2d Cir. 2007),
rev'd, 129 S. Ct. 1800 (2009); Gagliardo v. United States, 366 F.2d 720, 725 (9th Cir.
1966); Duncan v. United States, 48 F.2d 128, 134 (9th Cir. 1931); Complaint by
Appleton, 28 F.C.C.2d 36, 37 (1971).
257

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84:199

profanity to include speech beyond that which might be
considered blasphemous.2 59
The definition adopted in 2004
defined profane as "those personally reviling epithets naturally
tending to provoke violent resentment or ...language so grossly
offensive to members of the public who actually hear it as to
amount to a nuisance."260 This new definition was overturned by
the Second Circuit in Fox Television Stations, where the Second
Circuit vacated and remanded the Commission's Omnibus
Remand Order. 26' The Second Circuit found that the FCC's new
definition of "profane" "substantially overlap[s] with the
statutory term 'indecent'... render[ing] the statutory term
'indecent' superfluous."26 2 No new definition has been adopted,
nor was the issue raised in the Commission's petition for writ of
certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court.2 63

259 Golden Globe Order, supra note 106, at 4981.

We recognize that the Commission's limited case law on profane speech has
focused on what is profane in the context of blasphemy, but nothing in
those cases suggests ... that the statutory definition of profane is limited
to blasphemy ....Broadcasters are on notice that the Commission in the
future will not limit its definition of profane speech to only those words and
phrases that contain an element of blasphemy or divine imprecation, but,
depending on the context, will also consider under the definition of
'profanity" the "F-Word" and those words (or variants thereof) that are as
highly offensive as the "F-Word," to the extent such language is broadcast
between 6 a.m. and 10 p.m. We will analyze other potentially profane
words or phrases on a case-by-case basis.
Id. (footnotes omitted). Like indecent material, profane material may only be
broadcast during the safe harbor hours of 1:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m.
260Id. (quoting Tallman v. United States, 465 F.2d 282, 286 (7th Cir. 1972)); see
also FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 750 (1978) (approving FCC decision based
on nuisance rationale). The Court, in Pacifica, decided the case based on principles
similar to the law of public nuisance, which favors channeling behavior over outright
prohibitions. The Court favored channeling material that depicts or describes sexual
or excretory activity in a patently offensive way to times of the day when children
are less likely to be in the audience. Id. at 731-32, 750. While 47 U.S.C. § 326
prohibits government censorship of broadcast material prior to its broadcast, it does
not prohibit the FCC from reviewing the content of broadcast material after the fact
and sanctioning licensees who broadcast indecent, obscene, or profane material. See
47 U.S.C. § 326 (2006); Pacifica,438 U.S. at 735-38.
261Fox Television Stations, 489 F.3d at 466-67.
26 Id. at 467 ("[Olur cannons of statutory construction do not permit such an
interpretation ....").
26 See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 170, at 11; see also Brief of
Petitioner, supra note 170.
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Obscene Material

While indecent and profane material receive limited First
Amendment protection, obscene material does not and, therefore,
may not be broadcast at any time on broadcast stations nor on
cable or satellite channels. 2" The Supreme Court has opined
that to be found obscene, material must meet a three-prong test:
(1) an average person, applying contemporary community
standards, must find that the material, as a whole, appeals to the
prurient interest, in other words, material having a tendency to
excite lustful thoughts;2 65 (2) the material must depict or
describe, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically
defined by applicable law; and (3) the material, taken as a whole,
must lack serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.2 66
The Supreme Court has indicated that this test is designed to
cover hardcore pornography and not other forms of indecent or
offensive speech.26 7
While the definitions of broadcast indecency, profanity, and
obscenity are litigated and refined, the Commission has held off
on ruling on cases involving these issues. How they are resolved
will have a direct impact on whether the statutory conflict as
applied to broadcast political advertisements continues.

'6
See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973); Roth v. United States, 354
U.S. 476, 485 (1957). Separate statutes prohibit the distribution and transmission of
obscene material on cable and satellite television services. See 18 U.S.C. § 1468
(2006) (prohibiting distribution of obscene material on cable and satellite television);
47 U.S.C. § 559 (2006) (prohibiting transmission of obscene material on cable
services); see also 47 U.S.C. §§ 532(h), 544(d), 558 (2006). 18 U.S.C. § 1468(a) (2006)
reads, "Whoever knowingly utters any obscene language or distributes any obscene
matter by means of cable television or subscription services on television, shall be
punished by imprisonment for not more than 2 years or by a fine in accordance with
this title, or both." 47 U.S.C. § 559 reads, "Whoever transmits over any cable system
any matter which is obscene or otherwise unprotected by the Constitution of the
United States shall be fined under Title 18 or imprisoned not more than 2 years, or
both."
265 Roth, 354 U.S. at 487 n.20, 489.
26 See Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
267 See, e.g., id. at 23-25; Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 54 (1973)

("This Court has consistently held that obscene material is not protected by the First
Amendment as a limitation on the state police power by virtue of the Fourteenth
Amendment."); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 201 (1964) (Warren, C.J.,
dissenting).
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II. IMMUNITY AND POSSIBLE "EXCEPTIONS" TO THE POLITICAL
BROADCAST RULES
Despite the absence of express exceptions in the statutory
language, courts have applied what amount to indecency
exceptions to the political broadcast rules. Congress has never
recognized a clear exception to the political broadcast rules or the
indecency statutes.
The Supreme Court has recognized
broadcasters' immunity from liability for defamatory content in

broadcast advertisements aired in accordance with political
broadcast rules.2 68

The rationale offered for exception and

immunity could be applicable to all political advertisements and
thus resolve the conflict between the three statutes that are the
subject of this Article.
A.

BroadcasterImmunity for PoliticalSpeech Where Censoring
Is Prohibited
In Farmers Educational & Cooperative Union of America v.
WDAY, Inc., a broadcast licensee sought to remove defamatory
material from speeches made by legally qualified candidates for
political office.269
Presuming that 47 U.S.C. § 315 was
interpreted to ban such censorship of political speeches, the
broadcaster sought legal immunity from suit for broadcast of the
libelous statements.'
In WDAY, the Supreme Court affirmed
the equal opportunity mandate of § 315, opining that the basic
purpose of § 315 is "full and unrestricted discussion of political
issues by legally qualified candidates."271 Additionally, in holding

that § 315 prohibits censorship, the Court in WDAY aptly
recognized that the broadcaster is faced with a difficult decision
in deciding whether to censor political material in violation of
§ 315 or to risk being found guilty of libel or defamation.272
268

See Farmers Educ. & Coop. Union of Am. v. WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S. 525 (1959).

269

Id. at 529.

Id. at 526-27. Sorensen v. Wood, 243 N.W. 82, 85 (Neb. 1932), the first
judicial decision to address the issue of immunity from a libel suit, said that a
broadcaster could delete defamatory statements from political speech. Cases since
Sorensen uniformly have reversed course, instead recognizing broadcaster immunity
from libel suits relating to the broadcast of political advertisements. See Jack H.
Friedenthal & Richard J. Medalie, The Impact of Federal Regulation on Political
Broadcasting:Section 315 of the CommunicationsAct, 72 HARV. L. REV. 445, 480-81
(1959).
270

WDAY, 360 U.S. at 529.
272 Id. at 530-31.
22
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The lack of certainty as to the possible success of defenses to
libel and the natural inclination to err on the side of caution, the
Court opined, thereby either intentionally or unintentionally
chills speech.2"
Because time often is of the essence, thereby
heightening the angst of broadcasters faced with this choice, and
because of the nature of political campaigns and the limited time
period of election seasons, a candidate and a broadcaster may not
resolve the issue before voters take to the polls.2 4 Therefore, the
holding in WDAY provides a reasonable and workable resolution
of the broadcasters' dilemma when presented with political
speech containing defamatory material.
The Court in WDAY relied on legislative history and what it
concluded was Congress's intended purpose of fostering public
discussion of political issues and of not placing unreasonable
burdens on broadcasters, which play such an important role in
the political process.2 75
The Court in WDAY, therefore,
recognized immunity from defamation suits where a broadcaster
airs a political advertisement that defames an opposing
candidate.2 7 6 No such immunity has been recognized for the
broadcast of indecent material contained
in political
advertisements.
B.

"Exceptions"to the PoliticalBroadcastRules

Courts and the FCC have addressed claims that certain
political material is indecent and potentially harmful to
children. 7 In 1992, the FCC and the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Georgia interpreted the indecency provisions
of 18 U.S.C. § 1464 to be exceptions to the reasonable access,
censorship, and equal opportunities provisions of § 312 and

Id. at 530.
See id.
275 Id. at 528 nn.5-6, 530. The FCC has agreed, and legislative history supports
this conclusion.
276 Id. at 531. The Court affirmed the conclusion of the North Dakota Supreme
Court, which said that "[s]ince power of censorship of political broadcasts is
prohibited it must follow as a corollary that the mandate prohibiting censorship
includes the privilege of immunity from liability for defamatory statements made by
the speakers." Id. at 527 (quoting Farmers Educ. & Coop. Union v. WDAY, Inc., 89
N.W.2d 102, 110 (N.D. 1958)).
277 See, e.g., Stoner II, supra note 19, at 944-45; Mass Media Bureau Letter to
Kaye Scholer, supra note 19, at 5599-600.
273

274
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§ 315.278 In this early case, the FCC and the U.S. District Court
concluded that licensees were not obligated to broadcast indecent
political speech outside the safe harbor." 9
This conclusion
ultimately
was
overturned
by
the
D.C.
Circuit
in Becker v.
FCC. 280
In two 1992 U.S. congressional races, Daniel Becker of
Georgia and Michael Bailey of Indiana, attempting to convey
their anti-abortion stances, broadcast television campaign
advertisements depicting aborted fetuses. The advertisements
seemed specifically designed to repulse viewers and voters and to
sink the campaigns of their pro-choice opponents. The broadcast
stations in both cases received numerous complaints about the
gruesome images depicted over the broadcast airwaves. At least
one broadcaster asked the FCC to declare the advertisements
278 See, e.g., Gillett Comm'ns of Atlanta, Inc. v. Becker, 807 F. Supp. 757, 762
(N.D. Ga. 1992) (citing Memorandum by FCC Staff, Jan. 6, 1984, and granting
declaratory and injunctive relief and holding (1) that the prohibition against the
broadcast of indecent material was an exception to the reasonable access, equal
opportunities, and anti-censorship provisions; (2) that the abortion advertisement
was indecent; and (3) that a broadcaster could channel the abortion advertisement to
the safe harbor).
279 See Mass Media Bureau Letter to Kaye Scholer, supra note 19 (ruling on a
petition for declaratory ruling regarding anti-abortion political advertisement, the
Mass Media Bureau declined to rule that abortion advertisements as a class are
indecent, declined to foreclose warnings to viewers regarding contents of political
advertisements that might be harmful to children, but found channeling of political
advertisements that are not indecent to be in violation of reasonable access
requirements); see Public Notice Request for Comments, Petition for Declaratory
Ruling Concerning Section 312(a)(7) of the Commc'ns Act, 7 F.C.C.R. 7297 (Oct. 30,
1992). The Commission determined that further and comprehensive review of the
issue was necessary, writing:
Specifically, we seek comment on all issues concerning what, if any, right or
obligation a broadcast licensee has to channel political advertisements that
it reasonably and in good faith believes are indecent. We also seek
comment as to whether broadcasters have any right to channel material
that, while not indecent, may be otherwise harmful to children. In this
latter respect, we specifically invite commenters to address the proper
scope of any such right and the standard by which the Commission should
evaluate the reasonableness of broadcasters' judgments rendered in
exercising that right.
Id. The FCC later affirmed the Mass Media Bureau's decision that: (1) the abortion
imagery was not indecent under § 1464; (2) the material could be psychologically
damaging to children; (3) that § 312(a)(7) does not preclude channeling; and (4) that
§ 312(a)(7) does not violate the no censorship mandate of § 315. See also Petition for
Declaratory Ruling Concerning Section 312(a)(7) of the Commc'ns Act,
9 F.C.C.R. 7638 (1994).
95 F.3d 75, 84-85 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (vacating FCC ruling in Petition for
Declaratory Ruling, supra note 279).
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indecent and to permit broadcasters to channel those
advertisements to hours when children were less likely to be in
the viewing audience. The FCC concluded that the abortion
depictions were not indecent, but that because of the potential
psychological harm to children, § 312(a)(7) did not preclude a
broadcaster from exercising its discretion to channel the
advertisement or airing it at a time that would be less
detrimental to children. 21 ' Additionally, the FCC concluded that
channeling
the
potentially
psychologically
harmful
advertisement did not violate the prohibition against censorship
in § 315.282
The D.C. Circuit, in Becker, concluded that § 312(a)(7) and
§ 315 actually override programming discretion ordinarily
allowed licensees by the Communications Act.28 3 In other words,
pursuant to § 312(a)(7) and § 315, broadcasters must provide
reasonable access on equal terms without censorship to political
candidates for federal office despite the fact that the broadcaster
might find the material in the political advertisement indecent,
obscene, or profane. Unfortunately, the law does not expressly
provide that broadcasters may not be found liable for violation of
§ 1464 for the broadcast of such political advertisement featuring
material ultimately found indecent, obscene, or profane. There is
no clear exception. This unfortunate loophole presents the
dilemma facing broadcasters.
The D.C. Circuit in Becker, on review of the FCC ruling,
grappled with the question of whether the portrayals of aborted
fetal tissue-material that was not considered indecent-could be
281

See Petition for Declaratory Ruling, supra note 279 at 7643 (finding that the

depictions of aborted fetuses did not depict sexual or excretory organs or activities);
see also Becker, 7 F.C.C.R. 7282 (1992). With regard to the "Abortion in America:
The Real Story" program, the FCC stated:
The instant case presents the ... question of whether a licensee in the
absence of a Commission ruling as to whether a given political commercial
is or is not indecent, may nonetheless channel the advertisement to the
indecency safe harbor where it reasonably and in good faith determines
that the ad is indecent .... Under these circumstances, and until the
Commission provides definitive guidance, the staff believes it would not be
unreasonable for the licensee to rely on the informal staff opinion referred

to above and conclude that Section 312(a)(7) does not require it to air,
outside the 'safe harbor,' material that it reasonably and in good faith
believes is indecent.
Id. at 7282.
282 Petition for Declaratory Ruling, supra note 279, at 7649.
282 See Becker, 95 F.3d at 82.
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channeled to the safe harbor hours when children are less likely
to be in the viewing audience.2' 8 The court struggled with the
tension between the competing interests of children, broadcast
licensees, the voting public, and political candidates exercising
their right of "access to time periods with the greatest audience
potential. 2 85 The D.C. Circuit stated in Becker "[w]e are faced,
then, with competing interests-the licensee's desire to spare
children the sight of images that are not indecent but may
nevertheless prove harmful, and the interest of a political
candidate in exercising his statutory right of 'access to the time
periods with the greatest audience potential.' "26 The D.C.
Circuit observed that in light of this statutory conflict, the FCC
has afforded licensees the final say in deciding in favor of
children.2 87
As a threshold matter, the D.C. Circuit concluded that the
advertisement was not indecent because it did not fit the FCC's
definition.2"8 Additionally, the D.C. Circuit held in Becker that
channeling of political advertisements, even those containing
abortion-related content, to the safe harbor is not permitted as
such action would offend political broadcasting rules providing
political candidates reasonable and equal access to broadcast
outlets, as well as violate laws prohibiting censorship of political
speech. 289 The court concluded that channeling the abortion
advertisements to the safe harbor violated both § 312(a)(7) and
§ 315 by "permitting content-based channeling of non-indecent
political advertisements, thus denying qualified candidates the
access to the broadcast media envisioned by Congress."29 °
Broadcasters could not deny a candidate access to adult
2'

Becker, 95 F.3d at 77-78, 80.

285Id. at 80 (citing Licensee Responsibility, supra note 50, at 517).

286 Id.

(citing Licensee Responsibility, supra note 50, at 517). The gruesome

images pose potentially greater psychological harm to children than would exposure
to the naked body parts of living people.
287 Id.; Petition for Declaratory Ruling, supra note 279, at 7646.
"' See Becker, 95 F.3d at 84-85.
289 See id. at 80. But see Gillett Commc'ns of Atlanta, Inc. v. Becker, 807 F.
Supp. 757, 764 (N.D. Ga. 1992), appeal dismissed, Gillett Commc'ns v. Becker, 5
F.3d 1500 (11th Cir. 1993). The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Georgia granted a broadcaster injunctive and declaratory relief regarding the
broadcast of a potentially indecent political advertisement, finding that the material
was indecent because it described excretory activity and material. See id. at 765. The
court of appeals vacated and remanded without opinion, letting the District Court's
decision stand. Becker, 95 F.3d at 84-85.
'o Becker, 95 F.3d at 84-85.
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audiences just because children might be in the audience.29 1 In
this case, the D.C. Circuit seems to have implied an exception to
the indecency rules for political advertisements.
However,
neither the court nor either of the statutes in question expressly
provide for such an exception.
This issue also was presented in notable cases involving
political advertisements laden with racist and otherwise
offensive language.2 92 In response to the racist tirades of U.S.
senatorial candidate J.B. Stoner in the 1970s, the NAACP asked
the FCC to ban the word "nigger" as obscene or indecent in
2 93
accordance with the U.S. Supreme Court's holding in Pacifica.
The NAACP misunderstood the Court's holding in Pacifica to
apply to racist hate speech. In response, the FCC concluded that
use of the racial epithet "nigger" is neither indecent nor obscene
under its rules. 294 No matter how offensive the term, it describes
neither sexual organs, sexual or excretory activity, nor sexual
conduct in a patently offensive manner as is required pursuant to
the agency's rules.
The most important conclusion the FCC reached in rejecting
the NAACP's claim in response to the racist speech of J.B. Stoner
was that "even if the Commission were to find the word 'nigger'
to be 'obscene' or 'indecent,' in light of Section 315 we may not
prevent a candidate from utilizing that word during his 'use' of a
licensee's broadcast facilities." 295 The Commission has not as
forcefully stated this conclusion since Stoner I.
This single
sentence highlights the broadcaster's dilemma. Use of certain
language is certain to be offensive to many of a broadcaster's
audience, and indeed to the broadcaster also; however, because of
the right of equal opportunity to all candidates for the same
public office and the prohibition against censorship of political
advertisements by a broadcaster, the broadcaster must for the
sake of the political process and the rights of the candidate allow
even the most offensive racist federal candidate to use the public
airwaves broadcast facilities to spew hate, spread discontent, and
generally offend the public.
Neither the issue of indecent

21

See id. at 79-80.

Stoner I, supra note 19; Stoner II, supra note 19.
FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 738-51 (1978); Stoner II, supra note
19, at 943-44.
294Stoner II, supra note 19, at 944--45.
291 Id. at 944; see also Reed-Huff, supra note 20.
292
23
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political speech nor the conclusion suggested by the dicta in the
case of J.B. Stoner's advertisement, however, have ever been
clearly addressed by the courts. The Commission seems to have
created an implicit exception to the indecency prohibition for
political advertisements.29 6 However, such an exception never
has been expressly stated.
III. THE ANTI-FORD AND ANTI-ARCURI ADVERTISEMENTS
PROBABLY ARE FLEETING AND NOT INDECENT

The anti-Arcuri and anti-Ford advertisements probably are
not indecent, as they do not meet the current definition of
indecent material, nor are they patently offensive as measured
by contemporary community standards.
Nevertheless, they
signal a change in tone and content of political advertisements.
They also signal the ushering in of a new era of political
campaigning in which candidates, political action committees,
and corporations are more willing to use sex to sink an
opponent's campaign efforts.
A.

The Advertisements, While Offensive, Do Not Meet the
CurrentDefinition of Indecency

While the anti-Ford and the anti-Arcuri advertisements are
offensive,
racist,
and/or
sexually
suggestive,
neither
advertisement is indecent, obscene, or profane as defined by
statutory and regulatory law. Neither the anti-Ford nor the antiArcuri advertisements describe or depict sexual or excretory
organs or activities.
The depiction in the anti-Ford
advertisement presents a suggestion of nudity but no actual
depiction of sexual or excretory organs. Only the bare shoulders
of the young blonde woman are shown on camera.2 97 While the
anti-Arcuri advertisement shows a stripper appearing to perform
a suggestive dance, only the woman's silhouette is depicted on
camera, and she is not engaged in any actual sex act.298
Consequently, they do not fall neatly within the context of
the FCC's indecency definition. Additionally, even if they were
found to be indecent, they very well could be found to be fleeting
and isolated indecent material, the actionability of which will

2
'

See Stoner II, supra note 19.

See Too Hot for Corker, supra note 1.
See Bad Call, supra note 2.
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turn on judicial decisions and the Commission's response. These
advertisements, however, are precursors to future political
speech that might fall within that definition. Not satisfying the
definition of indecency, the FCC could not have sanctioned a
licensee who decided to broadcast either of these advertisements.
The advertisements admittedly do not present broadcasters the
exact legal dilemma contemplated by scholars and courts, but
they definitely signal a shift in that direction. It likely is only a
matter of time before broadcasters face the situation that will
force them to make this tough choice between competing
statutory obligations.
B.

Patent Offensiveness in Context and as Measured by the
Community Standard

Assuming for a moment that the advertisements were
deemed indecent and that the second part of an indecency
analysis-whether the material is patently offensive under
contemporary community standards-should be considered. As
discussed above, determinations of whether broadcast material is
indecent "[are] largely a function of context." 299 Context was
taken into consideration when Bono used the expletive to
describe just how happy he was to receive a Golden Globe
award. °° Context was considered in the Janet Jackson and
Justin Timberlake Super Bowl XXXVIII performance. °1
Therefore, the context in which the anti-Ford and anti-Arcuri
advertisements arose also must be considered.
In these cases, the context obviously is the political process
and specifically a political campaign for a United States political
office. While public opinion of politicians often is less than
laudatory, the public's disappointment with the conduct of
politicians is grounded in the notion, in theory, that on a certain
level we hold them to a higher standard as administrators of the
public trust. While we understand that politics can be a dirty
business, the mudslinging in political advertisements historically
has been contained to casting aspersions on an opponent's
character in the form of attacks on their political, social, and
economic policies. Because of technological advances-namely
' See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 742 (1978).
300 See Enforcement Bureau Golden Globes Decision, supra note 126, at 19,861.
301See CBS Corp. v. FCC, 535 F.3d 167, 171 (3rd Cir. 2008), vacated, 129 S. Ct.
2176 (2009).
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the popularity of twenty-four hour news programming and the
public's greater access to information provided by citizen
journalists on Internet websites-what used to be behind closed
door, private, and personal matters have now become much more
public
and widely
available
for
considerable
public
°2
consumption.
No matter how inappropriate a forum the
political campaign arena for gratuitous, titillating, and
suggestive sexual speech, candidates and politicians do
continually seem to be caught up in scandal involving sexual
misconduct that in some cases does have some bearing on their
suitability for public office. Presumably, opposing candidates
and their supporters would like to be able to capitalize on those
transgressions, and cash-strapped broadcasters might welcome
the revenues to be collected from those advertisements.
1.

The Material Is Not Explicit or Graphic

The
material
in
the
anti-Ford
and
anti-Arcuri
advertisements is neither explicit nor graphic. As discussed
above, there is no actual nudity or any depiction of explicit or
graphic sexual activity.
2.

The Images Are Fleeting and Do Not Dwell or Repeat at
Length
The material in the anti-Ford advertisement does not dwell
on nor repeat at length descriptions of sexual organs or activities.
The image, although repeated once, does not do so at length. The
image of the woman with bare shoulders appears on the screen
only for a few seconds.30 3 An argument could be made that the
material in the anti-Arcuri advertisement does dwell at length on
the image of the woman appearing to perform an erotic dance.
However, the woman is not naked, and there is no actual
depiction of sexual activity. °4
The material in both
advertisements could be characterized as fleeting in nature.
Under the pre-Golden Globes FCC indecency policy, this would
not be subject to FCC enforcement action. Under the newly

See generally Wolff, supra note 25.
' See Too Hot for Corker, supra note 1.
304 See Bad Call, supra note 2.
"2
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adopted policy, the fact that the material is fleeting would not
insulate it from agency enforcement action if, in the unlikely
event, it were found to fit the definition of indecency.
3.

The Material Is Not Intended To Pander or Titillate, but
Perhaps To Shock

The anti-Ford and anti-Arcuri advertisements do pander,
titillate, and arouse viewers. They are intended to and do arouse
our racial prejudices, fears, and/or willingness to stereotype.
These images probably were intended to shock viewing
audiences. In that way, they are just as, if not more, harmful to
children, the political process, and society at large as any other
sexual
content on broadcast television because
such
inflammatory advertisements are presented in a serious context
with the intent to confuse an already media-overwhelmed and
media-saturated electorate. While the depictions in both the
anti-Ford and anti-Arcuri advertisements are offensive and
gratuitous, they, however, probably were not intended to pander,
titillate, or sexually arouse the viewers. Instead, they were
intended to taint the image of both Ford and Arcuri as well as
their chances of victory respectively. In the case of Ford, the
advertisement likely was intended to evoke racial images and
prejudicial thoughts against Ford.
Television content in general has become much racier.
Additionally, sexually suggestive material is commonplace on
broadcast, cable, and satellite television, as well as on the
Internet, particularly when websites such as YouTube, MySpace,
and Facebook 30 5 are factored into the analysis. 3 6 The bar has
been set very low. Compared to regularly scheduled primetime
programming, today's political advertisements still probably
would be considered appropriate for general audiences including
children. The regular prime time line up on the big four
broadcast networks, on the other hand, provides a steady diet of
30, MySpace and Facebook are social networking websites that allow users to
post photographs, videos, and various personal information.
306 The CBS network aired a racy program titled "Swingtown" during the
summer of 2008. The show featured the lives of adults who engage in the "swinger"
lifestyle, which involves having sex with multiple partners. Groups like the Parents
Television Council voiced opposition to the program. See, e.g., Press Release, Parents
Television Council, PTC Urges CBS Affiliate To Pre-empt "Swingtowrn" (June 9,
2008), available at http://www.parentstv.org/PTC/news/release/2008/0609.asp (last
visited Apr. 11, 2010).

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84:199

sex, violence, and generally base programming. Programming on
cable television generally is even more permissive, particularly
when the excessive drinking and sexually suggestive material
commonplace in many reality shows are factored in.3 °7
The race to the bottom with respect to the quality of
television programming also might reflect a growing tolerance in
American society for the crass, suggestive, and base material
308
streamed into our households every minute of every day.
There is, after all, no huge ground swell of public outrage. The
majority of indecency complaints received by the FCC in recent
years have originated from one watchdog organization, the
Parents Television Council. 0 9
Americans, in large part, seem to have become desensitized
to sexualized material on television.
Advertisements for
condoms, breast enlargement, erectile dysfunction medications,
and other products touting the ability to enhance intimate
satisfaction can be seen on television all day long, even during
times of the day when children are very likely to be in the
viewing audience. The number of sex scandals involving public
figures and the twenty-four hour news coverage of these scandals
has brought the language of sex to a prominent place in
contemporary news coverage. This material routinely crawls
across the bottom of the television screen on morning news

307 Cable and satellite enjoy greater freedom to broadcast indecent material that
would be banned on broadcast stations. The Internet is largely unregulated in
almost all respects.
308See Edward Wyatt, It Turns out You Can Say that on Television, over and
over, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2009, at Al (discussing the increased use of crass
language on television). On the other hand, there are thousands of indecency
complaints pending at the FCC which presumably are awaiting the resolution of the
issue of whether the policy of sanctioning fleeting material violates the First
Amendment. See John Eggerton, FCC Tackles Backlog of Indecency Inquiries,

BROAD. & CABLE, Mar. 8, 2010.

" See Sharokh Sheik, FCC Indecency Violations: Should the FCC Be Able To
Fine Non-Broadcast Licensees for Indecency Violations?, 35 Sw. U. L. REV. 457, 472
(2006). The Parents Television Council is an "advocacy organization, [pirotecting
children against sex, violence, and profanity in entertainment." Parents Television
Council, Home Page, http'J/www.parentstv.org/welcome.asp (last visited Apr. 20,
2010). The Parents Television Council makes it incredibly easy for visitors to its
website to file indecency complaints with the FCC. The website provides multiple
links directly to the FCC. See, e.g., Parents Television Council, BroadcastIndecency
Campaign, httpsJ/www.parentstv.org/PTC/fcc/fcccomplaint.asp (last visited Apr. 20,
2010).
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television programs. The details of the alleged sex acts are
openly discussed at all times of the day by television
newscasters.3 10
Due to our exposure to crass and coarse television
programming, the American public in many ways has developed
immunity to this type of material that has invaded the homes
This
and the minds of all viewers, not just children. 31 1
permissive trend suggests that content is less and less likely to
When the
offend the contemporary community standard.
broader availability of and subscription to cable, satellite, and
high-speed Internet services is factored in, our collective
resistance to indecent material becomes even more evident.
With this desensitization comes the fear that the American
public has lost the ability to be discerning regarding indecent
material. FCC policy, however, historically has been highly
protective of children, seeking to shield them from the potentially
harmful effects of excessive sexual content in broadcast radio and
television programming. Free over-the-air broadcasting has a
uniquely special place in the American marketplace of ideas.3 12 It
is available to everyone regardless of economic status. Many
households have abandoned subscription services altogether due
to the questionable content and otherwise prohibitive costs
associated with those subscription services. Preserving at least
broadcasting-for
one relatively safe venue-over-the-air
balanced, relatively innocuous programming is important to the
democracy. There are no separate standards for entertainment
programming and advertising content, but as it relates to a
matter as socially important as informing the voting public,
perhaps there should be. Perhaps broadcasting should be held to
a higher standard than other programming platforms. Similarly,
perhaps political advertisements also should be held to a higher
standard than other content. The pressing legal and policy
question, though, is whether the government and broadcasters
should be making these determinations for the public.

See, e.g., Reliable Sources (CNN television broadcast Dec. 27, 2009), available
at http/www.cnn.com/video/#/video/politics/2009/12/27/2009.the.age.of.sex.scandals.
cnn?iref=alsearch (showing a montage of television discussions of 2009 sex
scandals).
311 See id.
312 FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 742 (1978).
310
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Additionally, the fact that the political advertisements in
question are aired by an increasingly consolidated and corporatecontrolled media is relevant to this analysis. Consolidation in
the news industry has resulted in fewer traditional sources and
outlets distributing what historically have been viewed as
reliable information based on sound journalistic principles. So, a
possibly less discerning electorate is being fed a diet of news and
information by an increasingly smaller subset of sources and
outlets.
Although there are no outright bona fide news exemptions to
the indecency prohibition, if the FCC begins to recognize
exceptions to the indecency rule, the exceptions could threaten to
swallow the rule prohibiting the broadcast of indecent
material. 13 Its handling of "The Early Show" demonstrates a
willingness to extend these exemptions. 14 Recognition of formal
exceptions to the indecency prohibition would extend the
obscenity exceptions for artistic expression, bona fide news
coverage, documentaries, news interviews, and of course political
speech to indecency and profanity. 5 Should this happen, an
argument could be made that there is no compelling reason for
maintaining the indecency rule.
IV. RESOLUTION OF THE STATUTORY CONFLICT IS POSSIBLE

To date, Congress and the FCC have left unresolved the
question of whether a broadcaster will be subject to criminal
prosecution in "future election-related conflicts" where the
political speech is indeed indecent under the FCC's and courts'
definition of the term.316 In light of the possibility of a
questionably indecent political advertisement, however remote or
far in the distant future, a legally sound solution is warranted. If
the Second and Third Circuits and/or the Supreme Court vacate
the indecency rules altogether, then this case is closed. There
will be no conflict. If the courts uphold the pre-Golden Globes
indecency rules, then a resolution of the statutory conflict is
necessary. Either the FCC, Congress, or lower courts will have
"' Omnibus Remand Order, supra note 89.
a Discussed supra at Part I.C.l.a.
315 See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973); 47 U.S.C. § 315 does
include exceptions for a bona fide news cast, bona fide news interview, bona fide
documentary, and on the spot coverage of bona fide news events.
31I See Mortlock, supra note 19, at 211-12.
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to revisit this issue seeking to resolve the statutory dilemma.
Congress could resolve this dilemma in one of a number of
3 17
different ways.
In her comment, Samantha Mortlock correctly characterizes
the broadcasters' dilemma and proposes reasonable resolutions of
the conflict."' She suggests that this statutory conflict may be
resolved by either amending, clarifying, or repealing the political
319 It
broadcast rules or by granting immunity to broadcasters.
also has been suggested that Congress could amend the
reasonable access and equal opportunity statutes to expressly
exclude political advertisements that include indecent, obscene,
or profane material, effectively banning all broadcast indecency,
including that in political advertisements. Second, Congress
could expressly create an exception to the anti-censorship
provisions of § 326 and § 315 of the Communications Act, thus
broadcasters
to
channel
indecent
political
permitting
advertisements to the safe harbor. Third, Congress simply could
repeal entirely the reasonable access and equal opportunities
provisions.
In addition to those proposals already offered, there are some
First,
other possible resolutions of this statutory conflict.
Congress or the courts could carve out an express exception to
the indecency prohibition for political advertisements. Congress
317 See id. at 221-25; see also Lili Levi, The FCC, Indecency, and Anti-Abortion
PoliticalAdvertising, 3 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 85, 219 (1996); Milagros RiveraSanchez & Paul H. Gates, Jr., Abortion on the Air: Broadcasters and Indecent
Political Advertising, 46 FED. COMM. L.J. 267, 286-87 (1994) (arguing that
broadcasters can channel abortion advertisements to safe harbor but warns against
expanding definition of indecency; favors warnings and disclaimers); Hille von
Rosenvinge Sheppard, The Federal Communications Act and the Broadcast of
Aborted Fetus Advertisements, 1993 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 393, 410-14 (1993) (addressing
advertisements containing images of aborted fetus suggesting amending § 315 to
permit broadcasters to refuse to air; expand definition of indecency to include other
offensive material such as violence; allow stations to channel and to ban political
advertisements from children's television); Kristine A. Oswald, Mass Media and the
Transformation of American Politics, 77 MARQ. L. REV. 385, 410 (1994); Lisa
Suzanne Mangan, Comment, Aborting the Indecency Standard in Political
Programming, 1 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 73, 83-86 (1993) (considering abortion
advertisements indecent, considering images of aborted fetuses as harmful
programming; favoring permitting channeling which author does not consider
censorship, and advocating applying the nuisance rationale of Pacifica); Helene T.
Schrier, Comment, A Solution to Indecency on the Airwaves, 41 FED. COMM. L.J. 69,
104 (1988).
318 See Mortlock, supra note 19, at 211-12, 221-25.
319 See von Rosenvinge Sheppard, supra note 317, at 410-12.
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could prohibit indecent material in political advertisements.
Second, Congress could take a more revolutionary approach and
completely repeal the indecency rules altogether. In the absence
of congressional action, courts could do one of two things. Courts
could hold that the indecency prohibition no longer serves the
public interest. In the alternative, courts could uphold the new
fleeting expletives policy on the grounds that the broadcast
airwaves are a safe place for children, thus justifying the ban of
even fleeting expletives outside the safe harbor. The Second
Circuit's and the Supreme Court's decision in the fleeting
expletives case has significant bearing on the resolution of this
statutory conflict. Third, Congress could expand all of the rules
in this tripartite to include all cable and satellite channels
This Article reiterates some of the older suggested
resolutions and recommends others. This Article recommends
the following, in order of preference: (1) amend § 1464 to
expressly except political advertisements; (2) grant immunity to
broadcasters; (3) repeal the indecency rules altogether or make
them applicable to all services; (4) change the definition of
indecent material; (5) amend § 312 and § 315 to prohibit indecent
material in political broadcast advertisements; (6) permit
channeling of indecent advertisements; (7) require or permit
channeling of all political advertisements to the safe harbor;
(8) wait for the perfect case and decide then; or (9) repeal § 312,
§ 315, and the Zapple Doctrine.
What follows is a discussion, in order of preference, of some
plausible resolutions of this matter.
A.

Amend § 1464 To Expressly Except PoliticalAdvertisements

Congress could amend the indecency statute to expressly
except political advertisements from the scope of the indecency
statute. The D.C. Circuit in Becker v. FCC320 seems to have
demonstrated a willingness to do just this. This would be an
easy solution relieving broadcasters of potential liability. Such a
resolution would continue to enforce the indecency prohibition
against broadcasters in all other contexts, but would close the
current loophole and provide clarity to broadcasters in situations
in which they are presented with requests to air political
advertisements containing indecent material. Although § 1464
3

95 F.3d 75 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
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contains no express exceptions, the Commission also
demonstrated a willingness to carve out exceptions to the
indecency rule in the Omnibus Remand Order when it declined to
sanction the use of the word "bullshitter" on the CBS "Early
Show" because it was a news interview. 21
This alternative will not serve the larger issue of protecting
children from harmful material that might be presented in a
political advertisement, but it will preserve the right of a political
candidate to present him or herself to the electorate in the way
he or she chooses. It also preserves the right of the electorate to
see the candidate as he or she really is and to make an informed
decision as to whether to cast a vote for that candidate.
Such a resolution of the dilemma, however, could be viewed
as an endorsement of certain indecent speech and could undercut
the government's concern about subjecting viewers to the first
blow inflicted by exposure to indecent material. Critics might
argue that the first blow is no less painful in this situation than
it would be in other forms of broadcast material.
Alternatively, the FCC could announce a policy expressly
stating that it will not sanction indecent material in political
advertisements. This solution likely would be of little comfort to
broadcasters. Recent history reflects the FCC's willingness to
adhere to one policy, yet change that longstanding policy based
on changed governmental interests.2 2 Broadcasters would have
no idea exactly when these government interests have changed,
thus triggering application of a new policy.
B.

Grant Immunity to Broadcasters

Congress could grant broadcasters immunity from suit if
they choose to air these advertisements. This is a good shortand long-term solution. As others have suggested, this would be
the better solution of all of the options as far as solving the
statutory conflict. Currently, there is no statute or case law
providing immunity from liability in the event of indecent
political speech, but such immunity has been recognized and
upheld in the context of defamatory political speech. 23 The effect
321

See Omnibus Remand Order, supra note 89, at 13,326-28.

322

See generally Omnibus Order, supra note 19; Omnibus Remand Order, supra

note 89.
31 See Farmers Educ. & Coop. Union v. WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S. 525, 529-35.
(1959).
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of this option would be to grant broadcasters immunity from
liability under the indecency provisions in § 1464 by granting the
same type of immunity currently granted broadcasters who
broadcast defamatory political advertisements. 2 4
This proposal, however, does nothing to solve the
complimentary problem of the public airwaves being used as a
vehicle for the distribution of indecent material. The argument
against a grant of immunity for broadcasters is that a vote for
immunity likely would be interpreted by vocal opponents of
broadcast indecency as a vote in favor of more broadcast
indecency. Additionally, while this proposal also solves the
problem of disparate treatment of services-broadcasting, cable,
and satellite-opponents of broadcast indecency could frame this
as a repeal of an indecency regulation and therefore a step in the
wrong moral direction. They might prefer to see a prohibition of
indecency not only on broadcasts, but also on subscription
services as well. In other words, opponents of a grant of
immunity in the context of indecent political advertisements
probably would prefer, instead, broad prohibitions against
indecency on all services and an express prohibition of indecency
in political advertisements as well.
This immunity could extend to indecent and profane
material as well as to racial hate speech and obscene speech in
the spirit of providing the voting electorate as much information
as possible and of revealing the true character of a candidate.
Any such immunity clearly must be limited to the speech of
qualified candidates for public office and should not grant any
additional protection to broadcasters who use the public airwaves
themselves to slander individuals or groups such as racial
minorities.3 2 5 Nor should any such grant of immunity open the
door for broadcasters to air any more indecent, profane, or
obscene material in other contexts than is already permitted
under § 1464 and the FCC's current regulations.
Whether
First Amendment principles will immunize third-party noncandidate political speech is an unanswered question.

11 See id. at 535.

32 See LaVonda N. Reed-Huff, Radio Regulation: The Effect of a Pro-Localism
Agenda on Black Radio, 12 WASH. & LEE J. C.R. & SOC. JUST. 97, 140-43 (2006).
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Scholars have suggested that perhaps it is nonsensical for
Congress to grant broadcasters immunity from one of Congress's
Congress, however,
own most controversial prohibitions. 26
creates exceptions to its statutes all the time. Case in point is
one of the very statutes creating this statutory dilemma. Section
315 includes significant exceptions to the equal opportunities
requirement.3 27
Repeal the Indecency Rules Altogether or Make Applicable to
All Services
The Second and Third Circuits seem poised to overturn the
Commission's policy of sanctioning fleeting expletives and images
on First Amendment grounds.2 s If so, the Supreme Court likely
will uphold that decision. The courts could be wrong on this
Broadcasting does occupy a particular space in our
issue.
American democracy and the marketplace of ideas. It also has
certain public interest obligations not imposed on subscription
services and the Internet. Part of this public interest obligation
includes the protection and education of children.
Broadcasters are more like a department store than a
boutique, in that they serve a wide and diverse demographic.
Consequently, there must be trade-offs and a balancing of
interests of those diverse populations. The safe harbor strikes a
satisfactory balance by protecting children in the audience
during those times of day that they are most likely to be viewers
or listeners and providing time for presentation of content more
suitable for more mature audiences. Just as technology makes it
possible for parents to block unsuitable material, the available
technology also makes it possible for adults to record indecent
programming and to watch it any time of the day.
The fact that material is fleeting or repetitive does not
change the fact that children are heavily influenced by the
messages around them, whether they consume broadcast
material with or outside the presence of their parents. Further,
C.

See Mortlock, supra note 19, at 223-24 (asserting that because the conflict is
between three federal statutes, it cannot be resolved by invoking the Supremacy
Clause argument used in WDAY to find immunity for broadcasters of defamatory
political speech).
327 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (2006); see also supra notes 59-63 and accompanying text.
328 See Larry Neumeister, Appeals Judges Mock 'FleetingExpletives' Policy, AP
FINANCIAL WIRE, Jan. 13, 2010.
326
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as a whole, American society has become increasingly tolerant of
foul language." 9 That fact does not relieve the FCC of the
obligation to regulate in the public interest, which might not
necessarily conform to the public desire for indecency.
From a purely legal perspective, this seems to be a
reasonable option to resolving many of the problems at handthe unclear definition of indecency, the difficult application of the
standards, and the disparate treatment of competing services.
From a moral standpoint, however, this seems to be the wrong
approach. To allow opportunities for more sexually oriented
material over the broadcast airwaves would seem to be a step in
the wrong direction.
The hurdles to be crossed to effectuate this proposal are
quite high. On the one hand, the continued wisdom of the
indecency prohibition has been called into question as evidenced
in no small part by the Supreme Court's upholding of the FCC's
authority to sanction fleeting indecent material-finding the
FCC's conduct neither arbitrary nor capricious-yet remanding
to the Second Circuit for consideration of First Amendment
concerns.

330

Moreover, as discussed, herein, the differing FCC regulation
of cable and satellite service on the one hand and traditional
broadcast service on the other hand, does not make much
sense.3 ' A majority of Americans receive television service via a
subscription service provided either by a cable company or a
satellite service provider. 3 2
Most consumers of television

" See Wyatt, supra note 308 (reporting on the increased use of term "douche"
on television).
330 FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1812-13, 1819 (2009).
'a' See Clay Calvert, The Two-Step Evidentiary and Causation Quandary for
Medium-Specific Laws Targeting Sexual and Violent Content: First Proving Harm
and Injury To Silence Speech, Then Proving Redress and Rehabilitation Through
Censorship, 60 FED. COMM. L.J. 157, 170-76 (2008). Calvert criticizes the
"underinclusiveness" of the FCC's medium-specific regulation of minors' access to
indecent, profane, and violent material where broadcasters and providers of
subscription services are regulated differently. Id. Calvert explores the legislative
dilemma presented by the Second Circuit's decision in Fox relating to fleeting
expletives. Id. at 158. He suggests that "two knotty questions" now face legislators:
(1) proving harm, and (2) proving redress by providing sufficient evidence that the
regulatory scheme actually remedies the problem of exposure of children to harmful
material. Id. at 164.
' In October 2008, eighty-five percent of Americans received television service
via cable or satellite. Fewer U.S. Terrestrial TV Viewers After Analog Switch-Off,
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programming make very little practical distinction between the
services when channel surfing or selecting programs.
Consequently, on the surface, it makes very little sense that the
broadcaster occupying channel nine on the channel lineup is
subject to one set of rules when the cable channel on channel
nineteen might abide by a different set of rules. In the context of
political broadcast advertisements, perhaps it is nonsensical to
impose upon political candidates one set of rules when
broadcasting on cable or satellite but another set when
broadcasting on traditional broadcast stations. Perhaps the
broadcast indecency rules have seen better days.
This alternative gets right at the issues before the U.S.
courts of appeals and the U.S. Supreme Court relating to the
Commission's departure from thirty years of policy of not acting
on fleeting expletives and images. The FCC has had a difficult
time articulating a reasoned explanation for changing the
longstanding policy. Nevertheless, as it currently stands, the
FCC really may sanction fleeting images and expletives.33 3
Broadcasters argue that the current indecency rules put
them at an economic disadvantage compared to cable and
satellite services, particularly in this era of communications
convergence and widespread availability of more advanced
communications services. 3 4 Under the current rules, television
and radio broadcasters are prohibited from airing the type of racy
programming that has been popular of recent on the subscription
channels.33 5 Cable and satellite television and radio channels do
ABI RESEARCH, Oct. 21, 2008, available at http://www.abiresearch.com/press/1269Fewer+US+Terrestrial+TV+Viewers+After+Analog+Switch-off:+Survey.
m Fox Television Stations, 129 S. Ct. at 1812-13.
3'4 See Lili Levi, Chairman Kevin Martin on Indecency: Enhancing Agency
Power, 60 FED. COMM. L.J.F. 19, 32 (2008), available at http://www.law.indiana.edu/
fclj/pubs/v60/no1/LeviForumFinal.pdf.
In a world in which distinctions between cable and broadcast are in many
ways chimerical and in which cable has experimented with edgier
programming, continuing stringent enforcement of indecency rules against
broadcast stations would simply disadvantage broadcasters vis-a-vis their
regulatorily exempt competitors without significantly reducing the
availability of sexual content on television. This Response does not claim
that A la carte will necessarily lead to the consequences detailed above. It
simply argues that the Chairman's failure to address the possibility that A
la carte distribution could lead to either overbroad or underinclusive speech
regulation is a significant omission.
Id.
', See Calvert, supra note 307, at 172-73.
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not operate subject to FCC licenses and are not subject to these
indecency prohibitions. Consequently, they may air more harsh
language and more crude sexual content any time of the day, not
just during the safe harbor.33 6
The FCC could expand each of the rules to include all cable
and satellite channels. This proposal would require all cable,
satellite, and broadcast stations to provide reasonable access and
equal opportunities to political candidates and would prohibit
indecent material on all services equally. The benefit, of course,
is that it could potentially benefit the political process by
securing access to more outlets for political candidates. This
benefits the electorate and arguably society as a whole. Such a
resolution might be favored by proponents of rules that remove
indecency from all of television.
Groups like the Parents
Television Council are concerned about the prevalence of
profanity and sexual content on all services, not just broadcast
television. 3 7
The problem, however, is that the terrible confusion
surrounding broadcast indecency would then be introduced to the
subscription services arena as well.338 While one problem would
be solved, a larger one would be created.
Disallowing all
indecency even on cable and satellite potentially raises more
significant constitutional issues, including First Amendment
challenges, than even those raised by application of the rules to
broadcasters. 3 9 While this proposal would put all services on
equal footing, the unfortunate result, of course, would be to

Id.
See, e.g., Brief for Amicus Curiae Parents Television Council in Support of
Petitioners at 1, Fox Television Stations, 129 S. Ct. 1800 (No. 07-582); see also Ted
Hearn, Stevens Adds Cable to Indecency Jihad, MULTICHANNEL NEWS, Mar. 7, 2005,
at 1 ("[A] recent Parents Television Council study.., said that 75% of teenagers
watch MTV, which includes programming rife with 'sexually suggestive acts of
violence and abuse of women.' "). Former FCC Chairman Kevin Martin and former
Senator Ted Stevens had called for regulating indecency on cable and satellite
services. See Open Forum on Decency: HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Commerce,
Science and Transportation, 109th Cong. 1-2, 9-12 (2005) (statements of Sen. Ted
Stevens, Chairman, S. Comm. on Commerce, Science and Transportation and of
Kevin J. Martin, Chairman, FCC), available at http://www.commerce.senate.gov/pdf/
decency2.pdf.
33 See Calvert, supra note 331, at 166.
33'See Clay Calvert, Bono, the Culture Wars, and a Profane Decision: The FCC's
Reversal of Course on Indecency Determinationsand Its New Path on Profanity, 28
SEATMLE U. L. REV. 61, 75 (2004).
336

33
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extend the dilemma to more services than it already is, thus
exacerbating the statutory dilemma at issue in this Article.
Any such economic disadvantage type argument made by
broadcasters, however, must be informed by the fact that
broadcasters operate in a highly regulated industry and pursuant
to a license, which does not confer on them an absolute fee simple
ownership right. 4 ° Because of this limitation, broadcasters are
not entitled to any expectation of treatment on parity with that of
subscription services. While it is true that subscription services
do use the public airwaves, and that satellite service providers
are subject to licensing of their satellites and earth stations, they
simply are not regulated in the same way as are broadcast
licensees. This quasi-private property nature of subscription
services is in part why the FCC has not to date extended the
341
broadcast rules to satellite and cable services.
With ratings for cable television programs rising, arguably,
American viewers and listeners are not as offended by the state
of broadcast programming as the increased number of indecency
complaints would suggest. 342 Therefore, perhaps the indecency
rules no longer are necessary or desirable by the contemporary
viewing community.
On the other hand, while most indecency complaints in
recent years are the result of a very active watchdog group, many
Americans if pressed on the issue might reveal a strong distaste
for the crass material on broadcast as well as cable and satellite
channels. 3 While not compelled to complain to the FCC about
340 See Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1162 (stating that the Act does not

provide for private ownership of airwaves; rather, permission to use airwaves is
conferred by the government in the form of a license). A license is a nonpossessory
right to use or go over the property of another for a specific purpose. See, e.g.,
Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. v. Dorsey, 149 So. 759, 761 (Fla. 1933) ("A license is a
mere permit to use the property of another."); Tatum v. Dance, 605 So. 2d 110, 112
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (quoting Dotson v. Wolfe, 391 So. 2d 757, 759 (Fla. 1980),
affd on reh'g, 629 So. 2d 127 (Fla. 1993) ("[A] license is merely a personal right to
use the property of another for a specific purpose.").
34 The FCC has long resisted calls to extend its indecency regulations
to
subscription services. See John C. Quale & Malcolm J. Tuesley, Space, the Final
Frontier-ExpandingFCC Regulation of Indecent Content onto Direct Broadcast
Satellite, 60 FED. COMM. L.J. 37, 38 (2007).
342 See NIELSEN, A2/M2 THREE SCREEN REPORT (2009), http'//en-us.nielsen.
com/etc/medialib/nielsen dotcom/enus/documents/pdf/white-papers-andrports.Pa
r.30466.File.dat/3ScreenQ309_USrpt_12.07final.pdf.
34' The Parents Television Council is a media watchdog group that seeks to
address the prevalence of "sex, violence, and profanity on television" and radio via
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this content, they might indeed desire greater federal control and
regulation of the indecent television and radio programming on
all services, particularly due to the lack of distinction in their
consumption of the services. In sum, they might favor increased
regulation of cable and satellite services as well. The public's
response to such a proposal turns at least in part on whether the
Parents Television Council and groups like it are speaking on
behalf of a silent majority or a vocal minority. Perhaps the
general viewing and listening public simply have become
particularly desensitized to broadcast content, are not offended,
or they are offended, but just not to the point of filing a formal
complaint. It is difficult to tell exactly which is the case.
Regarding fleeting expletives, a compelling argument could
be made that children are harmed just as much by the
cumulative effects of repeated exposure to isolated and fleeting
expletives over time as they are by exposure to material in a
single broadcast that dwells on or repeats sexual or excretory
material or activity. The bottom line is that once a child is
exposed to this content, it is forever emblazoned in the child's
psyche. This essentially is the FCC's argument supporting its
policy change. It should be of no or little consequence that the
FCC is slow in coming to this conclusion-thirty years to be
exact. Federal agencies must be allowed to revise its policies
after careful consideration of the past and anticipated future
effectiveness of those policies. Perhaps the FCC just needs to
articulate this more clearly to justify not only its policy change,
but to justify retention of the indecency and profanity restrictions
altogether. This proposal solves the statutory conflict, but it also
arguably is the most controversial of the proposed resolutions. It
also seems the most likely taking into consideration recent
language from members of the Supreme Court."
D. Change the Definition of Indecent Material
The definition of indecent material could be changed to
include not just patently offensive material that describes sexual
or excretory activities or organs, but also to include any other
enforcement of existing rules and influencing ongoing communications policy. See
Parents Television Council, About the Parents Television Council, http://www.
parentstv.orgIPTC/aboutus/main.asp (last visited Apr. 20, 2010).
' See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1820-22 (2009)
(Thomas, J., concurring); id. at 1833-38 (Breyer, JJ., dissenting).
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material that could be harmful to children. The FCC could refine
the definition of indecency to include sexually suggestive, as well
as racially offensive speech, such as that of J.B. Stoner. 4 5 Under
current application of indecency principles, the word "shit" is
indecent, whereas "nigger" is not. Both are equally offensive.
Also, it could include depictions of gruesome images, such as
aborted fetuses, as well as all fleeting images and utterances of
indecent or offensive speech.
Such a vague and broad definition, however, is sure to be
found to run afoul of the First Amendment. 346 Despite the likely
constitutional hurdle, this solution could resolve the statutory
conflict while simultaneously protecting children from various
forms of harmful speech. Hate speech also enjoys significant
First Amendment protection despite the psychological harm
caused by the speech to the individuals and groups it targets and
despite the overall harm to society caused by the speech.34 7
Generally, racist speech is protected, except in the workplace
where it creates a hostile work environment or it constitutes
fighting words creating a true threat of violence.34
The anti-censorship provisions in § 326 and § 315 are further
evidence of the freedoms afforded political candidates wishing to
use the public broadcast airwaves in furtherance of their
campaigns.
In the political broadcast context, the FCC
acquiesced to this general rule in the case of J.B. Stoner by
upholding the right of access afforded candidates for federal
elective office by § 312 and rejecting efforts to characterize racist
speech as indecent or obscene. 5 °
" See Stoner II, supra note 19, at 943-44; Stoner I, supra note 19, at 636.
46 U.S. CONST. amend.

I.

See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 392 (1992).
3'
See, e.g., Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358-59 (2003); R.A.V., 505 U.S. at
391 (striking a city ordinance banning bias-motivated crimes such as cross burnings
because the statute prohibited otherwise permitted speech, and stating that the
First Amendment does not permit the government to impose special prohibitions on
speakers who express views on disfavored subjects); Skyline Broad., Inc., 22 F.C.C.R.
8395, 8397 (2007) ("'[I]f there is to be free speech, it must be free for speech that we
abhor and hate as well as for speech that we find tolerable and congenial.'" (quoting
Zapis Commc'ns Corp., 7 F.C.C.R. 3888, 3889 (1992))).
- See 47 U.S.C. §§ 315, 326 (2006).
350 See Stoner II, supra note 19, at 944-45; see also Clay Calvert, Imus,
Indecency, Violence & Vulgarity: Why the FCC Must Not Expand Its Authority over
Content, 30 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 1, 10-11 (2007) (suggesting that any
attempts to expand the definition of broadcast indecency to include racist and sexist
speech will be void for vagueness).
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This resolution would require the Commission to offer a
reasoned explanation for changing its longstanding policy of
permitting the broadcast of fleeting material and also various
forms of hate speech that enjoy constitutional protection.3 5 1 The
FCC probably could not clear this constitutional hurdle.
E.

Amend the Reasonable Access and Equal Opportunity
Statutes To ProhibitIndecent Material in PoliticalBroadcast
Advertisements

Congress could clarify or amend the reasonable access and
equal opportunity statutes to expressly exclude indecent political
advertisements. To do so would resolve the conflict between the
three conflicting statutes and effectively ban all indecent
broadcast material from the airwaves between the hours of 6:00
a.m. to 10:00 p.m. During the day, candidates would be free to
put their indecent advertisements on cable and satellite channels
and on the Internet, bypassing broadcasters altogether. Voters
likewise could receive the candidate's message simply by
switching to the Internet or to a cable or satellite channel. The
public still, however, might be subjected to indecent material
that might be harmful to children during the late night hours,
but broadcast would be a relative safe haven.
In the context of indecency, obscenity, and profanity in the
broadcast media, the FCC achieves the goal of serving the public
interest through a combination of governmental and citizen
action. The FCC does not monitor the programming of its
licensees for the purpose of levying forfeitures for rule violations,
but rather regulates in large part by acting upon complaints
about media content, which are filed with the agency by
broadcast viewers and listeners after the material has been
broadcast.3 25 At the root of indecency, obscenity, and profanity
determinations are the contemporary community standard and

351 See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1811 (2009)
(addressing the isolated and fleeting use of various forms of the words "shit" and
"fuck" and other profane material); CBS Corp. v. FCC, 535 F.3d 167, 175 (3d Cir.
2008), vacated, 129 S. Ct. 2176 (2009).
32 See, e.g., Becker, 7 F.C.C.R. 7282, 7282 (1992) ("The Commission and Bureau
have declined to render indecency rulings in advance of broadcasts." (citing Letter
from Mass Media Bureau, FCC, to Christian Action Network (June 12, 1992) (on file
with author))).
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the context in which the material is presented. 5 3 Deputizing the
entire public as the watchdogs or monitors of broadcast material,
in theory, results in agency decisions more closely reflecting
these community standards than would be possible were those
determinations made solely by a small number of commissioners
or FCC staffers. Moreover, this public watchdog function is
essential because, as discussed herein, the FCC is prohibited
from engaging in censorship of all broadcast material, not just
material of a political nature.3 54
Taking into consideration
contemporary
community
standards and the context in which the speech occurs, an
argument could be made that political advertisements should be
a safe haven from presentation of gratuitous, confusing, and
often untrue private, intimate, and sexually suggestive matters.
The political broadcast advertisement, it could be argued, simply
is an inappropriate venue for the racy content commonplace in
other genres of television and radio broadcast programming.
With the amount of information Americans process daily from
multiple media sources, it has become more difficult to sift
through it all and to find the real truth, particularly when
convoluted by irrelevant, misleading, and gratuitous sexual or
sexually suggestive content. Political broadcast material should
be free from this type of often misleading content. The political
process ideally would seek to highlight truths and to inform the
electorate, not to pander, titillate, or seduce with misleading and
gratuitous sexually suggestive content.
As currently written, the statutes and regulations enacted to
serve the public interest in protecting children from the potential
harms of exposure to indecent, obscene, and profane material
broadcast via the public airwaves are in conflict with the laws
that have been enacted to enhance and protect the political
process by protecting the rights of candidates for political office to
use the public airwaves for the purpose of furthering their
political campaigns."'
30 See Indecency Policy Statement, supra note 90, at 8002; FCC v. Pacifica
Found., 438 U.S. 726, 750 (1978) ("We have not decided that an occasional
expletive... would justify any sanction or, indeed, that this broadcast would justify
a criminal prosecution. The Commission's decision rested entirely on a nuisance
rationale under which context is all-important.").
3
See 47 U.S.C. §§ 315, 326.
-5
See 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (2006) (prohibition against the broadcast of indecent,
profane, or obscene material); 47 U.S.C. § 312 (2006) (reasonable access for federal
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The wisdom of this solution is highly questionable, as
currently it is not even clear that Congress and the FCC should
ban any indecent material on broadcast stations at all. In light
of the uncertain constitutional viability of the current indecency
rules, any resolution that depends on a broadcaster's actual
assessment of the content of an advertisement for indecency is
bound to be problematic, creating more problems than would be
solved. The definition of indecency has proven difficult to apply,
particularly as it relates to fleeting images and utterances. The
standards from one station to another and from one community
to another could be applied differently, making it nearly
impossible for candidates to predict which advertisements will be
accepted, and at which time of the broadcast day their
advertisements might be aired. This is an inefficient resolution
that also could drive up costs to political candidates and
broadcasters who engage in litigation over the issue of whether
an advertisement was properly accepted, rejected, or channeled.
The difficulty in determining what material qualifies as
indecent can create greater confusion. This alternative leaves too
much discretion in the hands of broadcasters and presents
greater opportunity for misuse or misapplication of the rules and
the indecency standard. Until the definition of indecency and its
scope and application are clarified, this solution is unacceptable
and unworkable.
F.

Permit or Require Channelingof Indecent Political
Advertisements to the Safe Harbor

Congress could expressly create an exception to the anticensorship provisions of § 326 and § 315 of the Communications
Act to permit broadcasters to channel indecent political
advertisements to the safe harbor hours of 10:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m.
when children are less likely to be in the viewing audience.
Without this exception, such attempts to channel political
advertisements to particular hours of the broadcast day would

candidates); 47 U.S.C. § 315 (2006) (equal opportunities for all candidates and
censorship prohibition); 47 C.F.R. § 73.670 (2010) (limiting the number of minutes
that may be devoted to commercials during children's television programming);
47 C.F.R. § 73.4165 (2010) (indecent broadcasts); 47 C.F.R. § 73.4170 (2010) (obscene
broadcasts).
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violate the express prohibitions against censorship and
contradict the D.C. Circuit's holding in Becker. 6
To effectuate this resolution, Congress, the courts, and the
FCC would need to adequately address the D.C. Circuit's holding
in Becker that channeling to the safe harbor political
advertisements containing abortion-related images violated
§ 312(a)(7) and § 315."' Political candidates were held to have
the right of access to times of the day when voters are most likely
to be in the audience.
If broadcasters are given the authority to so channel
indecent political advertisements, the potential harm to children
would be diminished, albeit only to the extent that the
underlying assumption that children are less likely to be in the
viewing audience actually holds true. Permitting channeling of
select advertisements, however, has some other more identifiable
problems.
The most obvious problem is associated with the difficulty in
actually defining what constitutes indecent material. Again,
there is too much discretion left to the broadcasters to apply a
confusing and unclear set of rules. Because neither the courts,
Congress, nor the FCC has been able to provide broadcasters
clear guidance as to what material it will sanction, broadcasters
might err on the side of caution and channel more material than
is necessary.
While the definition of what constitutes
indecency becomes marginally clearer with each court decision,
few broadcasters necessarily want to put their licenses in
jeopardy and incur the huge costs of litigation to defend a
decision to air a political broadcast advertisement for a case to
work its way through the judicial system.
Conversely,
broadcasters could find themselves liable for having channeled
an advertisement that the courts ultimately find was not
indecent and should not have been relegated to the safe harbor.
Either way, the broadcaster loses.
The media should simply be the forum for discussion and
distribution of ideas, not the censor of the message. In light of
"6 See Becker v. FCC, 95 F.3d 75, 84-85 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
357 Id.

I See B. Chad Bungard, Indecent Exposure: An Economic Approach To
Removing the Boob from the Tube, 13 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 187, 201-02 (2006)
(highlighting the FCC's inconsistent and ineffective application of the indecency
definition and advocating for the creation of an Indecency Review Board to rectify
the situation).
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the FCC's current activity in the indecency arena, and the lack of
clarity as to what actually constitutes indecent material,
broadcasters should not be pushed into a corner. To do so would
potentially quell speech as broadcasters, fearful of indecency
forfeitures, would become overly cautious and might reject too
many requests for political air time.
A related problem is that of discriminatory treatment of
indecent advertisements and those that are not. A large segment
of the viewing audience might be deprived of the opportunity to
view advertisements that might be aired only in the wee hours of
the morning. Not only is the candidate harmed in that he or she
is not given access to the same audience as might be his or her
competitors, but so is the entire electorate. This solution would
undoubtedly trigger litigation claiming discriminatory treatment
of political speech and harm to the electorate.
The government may impose reasonable time, place, and
manner restrictions on speech so long as the restrictions are
narrowly tailored to achieve a significant government interest
and do not burden more speech than is necessary.5 9 Channeling
is more like permissible time, place, and manner restrictions and
should be permitted.
This separation of indecent material
suitable for adults, but not children, generally is accomplished in
broadcasting by channeling indecent programming to the safe
harbor. The Commission has held that requiring indecent
broadcast material to be channeled in this way is a reasonable
and narrow time, place, and manner restriction consistent with
the First Amendment protections afforded other media.3 60 This
alternative is complicated by the Supreme Court's decision in Fox
Television Stations and of the highly probable outcome in the
Second Circuit's handling of the case on remand. 6 1
One may argue, however, that granting broadcasters the
authority to channel certain advertisements to the safe harbor
while permitting others to be broadcast during the hours of 6:00
a.m. to 10:00 p.m. is discriminatory because the time of day the
advertisements would be broadcast would be channeled based
solely on the content of the message.

359 See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. 41, 46-47 (1986); Young v.
American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 63 n.18 (1976).
0 See Pacifica M&O, supra note 101, at 2699.
"' See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1819 (2009).
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Neither Congress nor the FCC should push any policies
permitting broadcasters to refuse to air these advertisements.
Fostering a free marketplace of ideas and a political arena free
from censorship requires that neither broadcasters nor the
government quell political speech. While it is quite another story
were the broadcaster itself to make hateful, obscene, indecent, or
profane comments in other contexts, it could be said convincingly
that allowing political candidates to reveal their true selves
through their political advertisements, no matter how
distasteful, is actually in the public's best interest.
A collateral benefit of airing even negative material is that
the advertisements say as much about the sponsor of the
advertisement as they do about the person being attacked. It
takes a truly unique political candidate to use the word "nigger"
or any other racially offensive term on television or the radio, or
to use the public airwaves during prime time to air indecent,
obscene, or profane material wholly inappropriate for children.
Perhaps the public is better off having had this information
available in the public sphere. The electorate in many ways is
made better off by insight into the character of a sponsor of such
an advertisement because it goes directly to the public's
determination as to whether a candidate who sponsors such a
negative advertisement is ripe to be entrusted with the public
trust that is commensurate with holding public office. The public
is better served by having access to this information prior to the
election than by finding out after a candidate wins the office that
he or she intends to carry out his or her governmental authority
in a manner offensive, oppressive, or discriminatory to the
general public he or she has been elected to serve.
Allowing the advertisements to show the true fiber and
character of a candidate is better for society in the long run to the
extent that the electorate can see past the hype and hysteria to
the true message and messenger. Politically correct speech may
conceal the true character of a candidate, which is not always in
society's overall best interest. On the other hand, this type of
speech by a candidate may stoke negative stereotypes or may be
unnecessarily divisive. Nevertheless, it is better that the public
know this about a candidate prior to the election.
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G. Require or Permit Channelingof All PoliticalAdvertisements
to the Safe Harbor
Congress
could
require
or
permit all broadcast
advertisements to be channeled to the safe harbor, thereby
removing the discretion of broadcasters in deciding which
advertisements are indecent and which ones are not. In addition
to the problem presented by the D.C. Circuit's holding in Becker,
such a requirement might be found to be an unconstitutionally
overbroad attempt to regulate a very small subset of otherwise
permissible speech. 362 Additionally, to do so would potentially
harm the entire political process, as the political advertisement
would take on the same status as late night infomercials. They
would be rendered ineffective, as the potential audience reach
would be significantly reduced. Any such regulation that allowed
for broadcaster discretion to channel or not to channel would
suffer from the same problems as that of permitting broadcasters
to refuse to air indecent advertisements, as broadcasters still
would have to make the initial determination of indecency, which
in and of itself is wrought with problems. While permitting or
requiring channeling of all political advertisements would deal
with this problem of broadcaster discretion, it would
detrimentally impact voter education, issue awareness, and the
marketplace of ideas.
This proposal does not necessarily help the overall political
process. Overall, this is a more equitable resolution than those
options depending on licensees' determinations of indecency.
Nevertheless, this resolution severely undermines concerns about
protecting political candidates' access to a broad audience and
about not shutting candidates out from certain hours of the day
when that audience might be largest.
H.

Wait and See

Courts and Congress could simply wait and see what the
FCC does when a licensee actually does broadcast an indecent
political advertisement. Because some feel the possibility of an
indecent political advertisement is remote, regulators might
prefer this alternative. They would be waiting particularly to see
whether the Commission receives any complaints about the
broadcast and whether it issues a notice of apparent liability and
362

Becker, 95 F.3d at 84-85.
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forfeiture against the broadcaster for the indecent broadcast.
The FCC could set forth a policy of not acting on such complaints
in the context of political advertisements or could issue a
forfeiture, which it would have to substantiate, particularly if the
material is fleeting in nature. Pursuing this course, however,
fails to provide broadcasters with sufficient notice of what
broadcast material the Commission will or will not sanction. It
also fails to account for the agency's willingness to change policy
without a rulemaking proceeding.
Doing nothing at all does not seem particularly troublesome
if you take past FCC inaction as an indicator of the possibility of
a legal issue arising. However, it is only a matter of time before
this rationale collapses. The FCC simply has not yet been
presented with a case involving a political advertisement
containing material that falls neatly within the its definition of
indecency. If presented with a clearer case, the FCC very well
might sanction a broadcaster under pressure from groups like
the Parents Television Council. Until the Commission has a real
case before it, which route it will take remains a mystery.
I.

Repeal the Reasonable Access, Equal Opportunities,and
Anti-CensorshipProvisionsAltogether

Repeal of the reasonable access, equal opportunities, and
anti-censorship
provisions could eliminate
the conflict.
Nevertheless, this alternative is the most problematic of all. The
problems with this proposal are obvious. Were these provisions
to be repealed, a licensee would be free to reject political
advertisements altogether.
A broadcaster also could freely
discriminate
against
candidates,
parties,
and
issues.
Broadcasters might charge candidates higher rates than other
advertisers or otherwise offer them less than favorable terms and
treatment.
If the indecency prohibition stood, a licensee
voluntarily permitting candidates to use its station for the
purpose of political speech could then be subject to the indecency
provisions of § 1464 if that speech were later found to be indecent
under an uncertain indecency policy.
This least favored alternative would vest licensees with too
much power over candidates' access to the electorate via the
public airwaves. Additionally, because of the repeal of the
Fairness Doctrine, candidates would not have any right to
respond to attacks by opponents who might include deep-
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pocketed corporations following the Court's ruling in Citizens
United. Not only would candidates be harmed by such a policy,
but so would the general public and the political process itself.
The public interest would not be served.

CONCLUSION

Even if the advertisements in the new genre of racy political
advertisements discussed in this Article do not meet the
definition of indecency, they are dangerously close to the tipping
point that the courts and the FCC have danced around for many
years. They are closer to the realm of broadcast indecency than
are the abortion advertisements of the 1990s or the racially
offensive advertisements of the 1970s, yet not quite as egregious
as the wardrobe malfunction of Super Bowl XXXVIII, nudity of
"NYPD Blue," or the expletives of the various awards shows-no
matter how fleeting-that have suffered the wrath of the FCC in
recent years.
Nevertheless, in the context of promoting a
democratic society in which voters are adequately informed about
candidates' stance on substantive issues, these advertisements
lack any serious political merit and add little to nothing of value
to the political process.
The likelihood of indecent content
appearing in a political campaign advertisement, while once
unimaginable, or at least considered outside the bounds of public
decency, clearly now has become quite possible, particularly with
the doors now open for third-party corporations to request
airtime on broadcast stations.
The appropriate solution to this dilemma, however, is not to
revoke reasonable access and equal opportunities for political
candidates, for to do so would frustrate the public interest
obligations of broadcasters and would harm the public. Nor is
the answer to prohibit indecent material from political
advertisements because of the risk of censorship and the
possibility of undue influence of the media on the political
process.
Absent a complete repeal of the indecency ban
altogether, which could be on the horizon and legally justifiable,
the more appropriate solution to this dilemma is to close the
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current loophole left open by the three existing statutes and
afford broadcasters the same type of immunity from liability that
3 63
currently is afforded them in the context of defamation suits.

3

See Farmers Educ. & Coop. Union v. WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S. 525, 535 (1959).
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